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 1 Introduction
The last decade has seen an increase in the number of hedge funds and the availability
of hedge fund data both on individual hedge funds and on hedge fund indexes. Unlike
mutual funds, hedge funds engage in dynamic strategies, use leverage, take concentrated
bets, bet on volatility and have non-linear payoﬀs. The tremendous increase in the number
of hedge funds and the availability of hedge fund data has attracted a lot of attention in
the academic literature, which has been concentrated on analyzing hedge fund styles (Fung
and Hsieh (2001) and Mitchell and Pulvino (2001)), performance and risk exposure (Fung
and Hsieh (1997), Brealey and Kaplanis (2001), Edwards and Caglayan (2001), Agarwal
and Naik (2004), Bali, Gokcan and Liang (2007), Gupta and Liang (2005), and Schneeweis,
Karavas, and Georgiev (2002)), liquidity, systemic risk and contagion issues (Getmansky,
Lo, and Makarov (2004), Chan, Getmansky, Haas, and Lo (2005) and Boyson, Stahel and
Stulz (2006)).
The aim of this paper is to analyze time-varying and state-dependent risk exposures for
various hedge fund strategies and obtain reliable estimates for predicted exposures of hedge
fund returns. The innovative aspect of this paper is that we study hedge fund risk exposure
conditional on diﬀerent levels of mean and volatility of the market risk factor, characterized
by the S&P 500.
Understanding and modeling hedge fund risk exposures is fundamental for both hedge
fund investors and regulators. For example, the recent subprime mortgage crisis of August
2007 exposed new types of risk for hedge funds, and currently there is a discussion of a
potential role of regulators to diminish the eﬀects of this crisis. This crisis also emphasized
the importance of credit and liquidity for hedge fund returns. For investors, a knowledge of
hedge fund exposures is essential in order to analyze risk-adjusted hedge fund performance
and to perform optimal asset allocation. Regulators are concerned about risks that are
common across diﬀerent hedge fund strategies. These risks can be responsible for ﬁnancial
trouble in the hedge fund industry and can act as catalysts for a spillover to other ﬁnancial
sectors, i.e., systemic risk. Moreover, regulators are worried if this joint risk across hedge
fund strategies is associated with a particular state or regime of the equity market. In
addition, regulators are concerned about an event where all diﬀerent hedge fund strategies
move to a high volatility state due to liquidity or non-market related shocks. This can lead
to the downfall of all hedge fund strategies at the same time and potential spillovers to
ﬁnancial markets.
Our approach provides a framework that can be used to address these issues and can beapplied in stress-testing analysis.
Hedge funds may exhibit non-normal payoﬀs for various reasons such as their use of
options, or more generally dynamic trading strategies. Unlike most mutual funds (Koski
and Pontiﬀ (1999) and Almazan et al. (2004)), hedge funds frequently trade in derivatives.
Further, hedge funds are known for the “opportunistic” nature of their trading strategies
and a signiﬁcant part of their returns arise from taking state-contingent and volatility bets.
There is currently a limited understanding of the real non-linear exposure to risk factors of
the diﬀerent hedge funds strategies. In the hedge fund literature, the analysis of risk exposure
is based on three main approaches. The ﬁrst approach is based on the classical linear factor
model applied to mutual funds. The second, introduced by Fung and Hsieh (1997), is based
on a predetermined structure of the risk factors (quintile analysis or extreme event analysis).
The third approach is based on option-like payoﬀs, also called Asset-Based Style Factors
(ABS-Factors), introduced by Fung and Hsieh (2001) and Agarwal and Naik (2004). We
add to the literature by proposing a new way of capturing dynamic risk exposure in hedge
funds based on volatility changes of the market risk factor.
In this paper, consistent with the asset pricing perspective proposed by Bekaert and
Harvey (1995), we suggest analyzing the exposure of hedge fund indexes with a factor model
based on regime-switching volatility, where non-linearity in the exposure is captured by factor
loadings that are state-dependent. The regime-switching approach is able to identify when
the market risk factor is characterized by normal, down-market or up-market conditions,
and the state dependent factor loadings are able to capture the exposure of hedge funds to
risk factors in these diﬀerent volatility states.1 To our knowledge this is the ﬁrst attempt
to analyze hedge fund exposure considering that the market risk factor is characterized by
stochastic volatility, i.e., calculating hedge fund exposure to the market factor by explicitly
accounting for the change in volatility of the market factor. This feature is relevant because
hedge funds bet on volatility, and factor loadings are aﬀected by the volatility of the risk
factors.
The importance of using regime-switching models is well established in the ﬁnancial
economics literature and examples are found in Bekaert and Harvey’s (1995) regime-switching
asset pricing model, Ang and Bekaert’s (2002) and Guidolin and Timmermann’s (2006)
regime-switching asset allocation models, Lettau, Ludvigson, and Wachter’s (Forthcoming)
regime-switching equity premia model, and Billio and Pelizzon’s (2000, 2003) analysis of VaR
1The expected returns and volatilities for each state are endogenously deﬁned from the data. Section 3
and Table 2 show that the return pattern of the S&P 500 could be easily captured with three regimes, where
up-market regime has a mean of 5.79% and a relatively low volatility 1.52%. The normal regime has a mean
of 0.85% and a volatility of 2.49%. The down-market regime captures market downturns and has a mean of
-2.02% and a volatility of 4.51%.
2calculation, volatility spillover and contagion among markets. Moreover, regime-switching
models have been successfully applied to constructing trading rules in equity markets (Hwang
and Satchell (2007), equity and bond markets (Brooks and Persand (2001)), and foreign
exchange markets (Dueker and Neely (2004)). Chan et al. (2005) apply regime-switching
models to the CSFB/Tremont hedge fund indexes to analyze the possibility of switching
from a normal to a distressed regime in the hedge fund industry. The implementation of the
regime-switching methodology is similar in spirit to ours; however, in our paper we propose
a regime-switching beta model to measure the exposure of hedge fund indexes to diﬀerent
regimes that characterize market risk factors. Such exposure cannot be measured with the
simple regime-switching model used by Chan et al. (2005) because this model does not
account for market risk factor regimes.
Our approach maintains the spirit of Fung and Hsieh (1997) and Agarwal and Naik
(2004), but we diﬀer from these studies in the focus of our investigation. Speciﬁcally, rather
than using ABS factors to capture dynamic strategies, we allow for dynamic factor loadings
with diﬀerent betas, where factor loadings are endogenously determined. In this way we
capture, with a formal model, the idea of Fung and Hsieh (1997) to separate factors into
diﬀerent quintiles based on historical performance and try to access the exposure of hedge
fund returns to factors in each of the quintiles. However, the use of quintiles implies the
exogenous deﬁnition of states. Rather, we let the model to determine the states. Our analysis
shows that hedge fund exposure to risk factors is related to a mixture of strategies based on
options. The framework is also ﬂexible, as we do not need to deﬁne a priori the strategy
that hedge funds may follow, but in line with the classical Sharpe-style analysis approach
(Sharpe, (1992)), the data highlight the dynamic exposure to risk factors. Therefore, we
have diﬀerent factor loadings for hedge fund strategies during diﬀerent market regimes.
Our analysis conﬁrms that hedge funds change their exposure based on diﬀerent market
conditions. Bollen and Whaley (2007) show that allowing for switching in risk exposure is
essential when analyzing hedge fund performance. We show that the exposures change over
time for all strategies, conﬁrming the time-varying risk exposure of hedge funds. Factor
loadings with respect to systematic risk factors vary in diﬀerent regimes for almost all hedge
fund indexes, validating the non-linear exposure to the market risk factor. We ﬁnd that in
many cases (i.e, emerging markets, distressed, event driven multi-strategy and risk arbitrage
strategies) hedge fund exposure to the S&P 500 in the down-state of the S&P 500 is greater
than in the normal state of the market. Moreover, our framework can capture the phase-
locking property of hedge funds introduced by Chan et al. (2005).2 For example, we observe
2The term “Phase-locking” behavior is borrowed from the natural sciences, and refers to a state in which
otherwise uncorrelated actions suddenly become synchronized.
3that for all strategies in the normal market regime, factor loadings are very low or zero for
some particular risk factors, including the S&P 500; however, factor loadings become very
large in the down-market or up-market regimes.
Our model is able to capture changes in factor loadings depending on the volatility of
the market and exposure to risk factors that, for a certain period of time, are negligible and
are not captured by linear models. More speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that exposures to Large-Small
(Fama-French Factor), Government Credit, and MSCI Emerging Market Debt are mostly
characterized by zero or small exposure during the normal state and signiﬁcant exposure
during market downturns. Moreover, our results show that risk factor exposures conditional
on market regimes are quite diﬀerent among hedge fund indexes.
The above results suggest, ﬁrst, that by using regime-switching models investors can
identify and select hedge funds and hedge fund indexes with favorable market exposure
in each regime and in particular in market downturns. They will also be more informed
about transition probabilities between diﬀerent regimes and probabilities of being exposed
to several market factors.
Second, our results suggest that the common exposures of diﬀerent hedge fund indexes to
risk factors in the down-state of the market are the exposure to the Large-Small risk factor
(which may potentially capture liquidity risk in line with Acharya and Pedersen (2005)),
Credit Spread (i.e., credit risk) and change in VIX. This suggests the possibility of a sys-
tematic risk among the hedge fund family that is not generated by direct market exposure.
The systematic risk is attributed to liquidity and credit risks, two typically non-linear phe-
nomena, and is more relevant during market downturns that are usually characterized by
large volatility. This aspect is important for regulators who would like to access systematic
exposure of hedge funds.
Third, our analysis shows that the idiosyncratic risk factor of hedge funds is largely
characterized by changes from a low volatility regime to a high volatility state that are
not directly related to market risk factors. We further explore the probability that all hedge
fund strategies exhibit idiosyncratic risk in a high volatility regime. This could be interpreted
as a proxy measure for contagion between diﬀerent hedge fund strategies. Speciﬁcally, we
calculate the joint probability of being in a high volatility state for all hedge funds. We
ﬁnd that the joint probability jumps from approximately 0% in May 1998 to 4% in June
1998 to 13% in July 1998 to 96% in August 1998, the month of the Long-Term Capital
Management (LTCM) collapse. It started to subside in October 1998. The peak in the
joint probability coincides with the liquidity crisis precipitated by the collapse of the LTCM.
The results suggest that the LTCM crisis not only aﬀected market risk factors, but also,
after controlling for market and other factor exposures, aﬀected idiosyncratic volatility of
4hedge funds. This provides evidence that even after accounting for market and other factor
exposures, the LTCM crisis precipitated contagion across the hedge fund industry.
Robustness analysis and out-of-sample forecasting experiments conﬁrm the economic
importance of accounting for the presence of market regimes for determining hedge fund risk
exposure.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we develop a theoretical
framework and deﬁne a series of beta regime-switching models that can be used to analyze
diﬀerent hedge fund style indexes. Section 3 describes data and presents results for the
one-factor and multifactor beta regime-switching models. Section 4 presents analysis on
omitted factors. Section 5 presents analysis on evolution of the idiosyncratic risk factor.
Section 6 provides robustness checks. We compare our approach to OLS, asymmetric beta
and threshold models. We also adjust for potential illiquidity and smoothing in the data
and check that regime-switching approach is applicable to individual hedge funds as well as
indexes. Section 7 conducts an out-of sample analysis. Section 8 concludes.
2 Theoretical Framework
Linear factor models such as the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) and the arbitrage
pricing theory (APT) have been the foundation of most of the theoretical and empirical
asset pricing literature. Formally, a simple one-factor model applied to hedge fund index
returns could be represented as:
Rt = α + βIt + ωut (1)
where Rt is the return of a hedge-fund index in period t, It is a market factor, for example,
the S&P500 in period t, and ut is IID.
In this model, we can identify the exposure of hedge fund returns to a factor I. Unfor-
tunately this theory constrains the relation between risk factors and returns to be linear.
Therefore it cannot price securities whose payoﬀs are nonlinear functions of the risk factors,
i.e., hedge fund returns that are characterized by the implementation of dynamic strategies.
For this reason we propose a more ﬂexible and complete model for capturing this feature: a
regime-switching model.
A Markov regime-switching model is one in which systematic and un-systematic events
may aﬀect the output due to the presence of discontinuous shifts in average return and
5volatility. The change in regime should not be regarded as predictable but rather as a
random event.
More formally, the model could be represented as:
Rt = α + β(St)It + ωut (2)
It = µ(St)+σ(St) t (3)
where St is a Markov chain with n states and transition probability matrix P. Each state of
the market index I has its own mean and variance. Hedge fund mean returns are related to
the states of the market index and are deﬁned by the parameter α plus a factor loading, β,
on the conditional mean of the factor. Hedge fund volatilities are also related to the states
of the market index I and are deﬁned by the factor loading, β, on the conditional volatility
of the factor plus the volatility of the idiosyncratic risk factor ω.3 In both cases β could be
diﬀerent conditional on a state of the risk factor I.






α + β0It + ωut if St =0
α + β1It + ωut if St =1
α + β2It + ωut if St =2
(4)
where the state variable S depends on time t, and β depends on the state variable:
β(St)=

   
   
β0 if St =0
β1 if St =1
β2 if St =2
(5)
and the Markov chain St (the regime-switching process) is described by the following tran-
sition probability matrix P:4
3In all Markov states, we assume normality of the error terms and homoskedasticity within regimes.
These hypotheses are not at all restrictive since, as it will be clear in the Section 3.2.1 and Figures 1 and 2,
the resulting return distributions are non-normal and heteroskedastic.











with p02 =1− p00 − p01, p12 =1− p10 − p11 and p22 =1− p20 − p22. The parameters p00,
p11 and p22 determine the probability of remaining in the same regime. This model allows
for a change in variance of returns only in response to occasional, discrete events. Despite
the fact that the state St is unobservable, it can be statistically estimated (see for example
Hamilton (1989, 1990)).
Our speciﬁcation is similar to the well-known “mixture of distributions” model. However,
unlike standard mixture models, the regime is not independently distributed over time unless
transition probabilities pij are equal to 1/n, where n is the number of states. The advantage
of using a Markov chain as opposed to a “mixture of distributions” is that the former
allows for conditional information to be used in the forecasting process. This allows us
to: (i) ﬁt and explain the time series, (ii) capture the well known cluster eﬀect, under
which high volatility is usually followed by high volatility (in the presence of persistent
regimes), (iii) generate better forecasts compared to the mixture of distributions model,
since regime-switching models generate a time-conditional forecast distribution rather than
an unconditional forecast distribution, and (iv) provide an accurate representation of the
left-hand tail of the return distribution, as the regime-switching approach can account for
“short-lived” and “infrequent” events.5
Moreover, our formal model allows us to make dynamic forecasts. More speciﬁcally,
once parameters are estimated, the likelihood of regime changes can be readily obtained,
as well as forecasts of βt itself. In particular, because the k-step transition matrix of a
Markov chain is given by Pk, the conditional probability of the regime St+k given date-
t data Rt ≡ (Rt,R t−1,...,R 1) takes on a particularly simple form when the number of
5The Markov switching model is more ﬂexible than simply using a truncated distribution approach, as
at each time t, we have a mixture of one or more normal distributions, and this mixture changes every
time. Using the truncated distribution will lead to a non-parametric estimation, where the down-state of
the market is exogenously imposed, and it is hard to make inferences about beta forecast and conditional
expectations. Instead, we use a parametric model to help us separate the states of the world. We are able
to infer time-varying risk exposures of hedge funds, make forecasts, calculate transition probabilities from
one state to another and calculate conditional expectations.
7regimes is 2 (regime 0 and 1):
Prob(St+k =0 |Rt)=π1 +( p00 − (1 − p11))
k
 





(2 − p00 − p11)
(8)
where Prob(St =0 |Rt) is the probability that the date-t regime is 0 given the historical
data up to and including date t (this is the ﬁltered probability and is a by-product of the
maximum-likelihood estimation procedure). More generally, the conditional probability of





Prob(St =0 |Rt) Prob(St =1 |Rt) ..Prob(St = n|Rt)
  
(10)






β ≡ [ β0 β1 ..βn]
  (12)
Time-varying betas can be easily determined by using equation 11 and setting k=0.
This gives us the framework for analyzing time-varying risk exposures for hedge funds for
diﬀerent factors. Moreover, this framework can be used to calculate expected time-varying
risk exposures for hedge funds for various factors, by setting k to be more than 0. For
example, if k=1, we can calculate the evolution of expected one-month beta exposures to
diﬀerent factors.
The model described in equations 2 and 3 could be extended in several ways. For example,
we propose a regime-switching model with non-linearity in the volatility of residuals and in
8the intercept coeﬃcient:
Rt = α(Zt)+β(St)It + ω(Zt)ut (13)
It = µ(St)+σ(St) t (14)
In this model, additional non-linearities are captured by the intercept and residuals. Zt is
another Markov chain which proxies for all other non-linearities not captured by non-linear
relationship between a particular hedge fund (index) and the risk factor I.
Usually more than one factor aﬀects hedge fund returns. Our regime-switching beta
model could be easily extended to a multifactor model.
The ﬁrst extension is a model in the same spirit as the model developed by Agarwal and
Naik (2004) with a non-linear exposure to the S&P 500 and a linear exposure to other risk
factors. More formally:
Rt = α(Zt)+β(St)It +
K  
k=1
θkFkt + ω(Zt)ut (15)
It = µ(St)+σ(St) t (16)
where θk is the linear factor loading of the hedge fund index on the k-th risk factor and Fkt
is the return on the k-th risk factor at time t.
However, this model does not consider the possibility that the exposure to other risk
factors could be aﬀected by the regime that characterizes the S&P 500. To capture this
feature, we propose a multifactor beta switching model with non-linearity in residuals:
Rt = α(Zt)+β(St)It +
K  
k=1
θk(St)Fkt + ω(Zt)ut (17)
I1t = µ(St)+σ(St) t (18)
This model allows us to detect the exposure of hedge fund indexes to diﬀerent factors
conditional on the state that characterizes the market index factor that in our empirical
analysis is represented by the S&P 500.
Goodness-of-ﬁt for our non-linear models is measured using McFadden’s (1974) pseudo-
R2 approach. In this approach, the unrestricted (full model) likelihood LUR is compared to






Pseudo-R2 measure has also been used by Boyson, Stahel and Stulz (2006) to compare
diﬀerent hedge fund risk models. The ratio of the likelihoods measures the level of improve-
ment made by the unrestricted model with respect to the restricted model. A likelihood
falls between 0 and 1, so the log of a likelihood is less than or equal to zero. If a model
has a very low likelihood, then the log of the likelihood will have a larger magnitude than
the log of a model with high likelihood. A small ratio of log likelihoods indicates that the
unrestricted model has a far better ﬁt than the restricted model. The pseudo-R2 measures
an improvement of the unrestricted model with respect to the restricted model. Thus, when
comparing two models on the same data, McFadden’s pseudo-R2 is higher for the model
with the greater likelihood. However, even though it ranges from 0 to 1 with higher values
indicating a better model ﬁt, pseudo-R2 is not a measure of explained variability, which is
captured by a classical OLS R2.
3 Empirical Analysis
3.1 Data
For the empirical analysis in this paper, we use aggregate hedge-fund index returns from
the CSFB/Tremont database from January 1994 to March 2005. For out-of-sample analysis,
we extend the dataset until October 2006. The CSFB/Tremont indexes are asset-weighted
indexes of funds with a minimum of $10 million of assets under management, a minimum one-
year track record, and current audited ﬁnancial statements. An aggregate index is computed
from this universe, and 10 sub-indexes based on investment style are also computed using
a similar method. Indexes are computed and rebalanced on a monthly frequency and the
universe of funds is redeﬁned on a quarterly basis. We use net-of-fee monthly excess return
(in excess of LIBOR). This database accounts for survivorship bias in hedge funds (Fung and
Hsieh (2000)). Table 1 describes the sample size, β with respect to the S&P 500, annualized
mean, annualized standard deviation, minimum, median, maximum, skewness and kurtosis
for monthly CSFB/Tremont hedge-fund index returns as well as for the S&P 500.
[INSERT Table (1) about here]
10For our empirical analysis, we evaluate the exposure of hedge fund indexes to the mar-
ket index, the S&P 500; therefore, we concentrate only on hedge fund styles that either
directly or indirectly have S&P 500 exposure. For example, we concentrate on directional
strategies such as Dedicated Shortseller, Long/Short Equity and Emerging Markets as well
as non-directional strategies such as Distressed, Event Driven Multi-Strategy, Equity Market
Neutral, Convertible Bond and Risk Arbitrage.
Categories greatly diﬀer. For example, annualized mean of excess return for the Dedi-
cated Shortseller category is the lowest: -6.48%, and the annualized standard deviation is
the highest at 17.63%. Distressed has the highest mean, 7.32%, but relatively low standard
deviation: 6.69%. The lowest annualized standard deviation is reported for the Equity Mar-
ket Neutral strategy at 2.94% with an annualized mean of 4.08%. Hedge fund strategies also
show diﬀerent third and fourth moments. Speciﬁcally, non-directional funds such as Event
Driven Multi-Strategy, Risk Arbitrage and Convertible Bond Arbitrage all have negative
skewness and high kurtosis. The exception is the Equity Market Neutral strategy, which
has a low positive skewness and kurtosis. Directional strategies such as Dedicated Short-
seller, Long/Short Equity have positive skewness and small kurtosis. Emerging Markets has
a slight negative skewness of -0.65 and a small kurtosis. The market factor is characterized
by high annualized excess return of 5.52% and high standard deviation of 15.10% during our
sample period. Moreover, the distribution of the market factor is far from normal and is
characterized by negative skewness.
3.2 Beta Regime-Switching Models
In the following sub-sections, all switching regime models have been estimated by maximum
likelihood using the Hamilton’s ﬁlter and the econometric software GAUSS.
Because of the limited dataset, we prefer to adopt a two-step procedure. We ﬁrst char-
acterize the S&P 500 behavior by a switching-regime model and then, conditional on this
result, we estimate our one-factor and multi-factor models.
Finally, in all our estimations we compute the robust covariance matrix estimator (often
known as the sandwich estimator) to calculate the standard errors (see Huber (1981) and
White (1982)). The estimator’s virtue is that it provides consistent estimates of the covari-
ance matrix for parameter estimates even when a parametric model fails to hold, or is not
even speciﬁed. In all tables we present the t-statistics obtained with the robust covariance
matrix estimators, which allows us to take into account a possibility that data may deviate
to some extent from the speciﬁed model.6
6For the switching-regime models the standard deviations obtained with the usual covariance matrix
113.2.1 S&P 500 regimes
In this section we ﬁrst verify the presence of the S&P 500 regimes in the data, and then
analyze the exposure of diﬀerent hedge fund indexes to the diﬀerent states of the S&P 500
market index by implementing the model described in equation 3.
In order to determine the number of regimes used in the estimation, we estimated and
tested models with diﬀerent number of regimes and ultimately decided that using three
regimes is optimal for our analysis. Using three regimes is also consistent with the literature
that well recognizes the presence of normal, rolling-up or downturn regions in the returns of
the equity market.7 The results of the estimation are shown in Table 2.
[INSERT Table (2) about here]
Table 2 shows that the return pattern of the S&P 500 could be easily captured with three
regimes, where regime 0 has a mean of 5.79% and a relatively low volatility of 1.52%. We
denote this regime as the up-market state, which has a very low probability of remaining
in the same regime in the following month: P00=28%. Regime 1 has a mean statistically
diﬀerent than zero and equal to 0.85% and a volatility of 2.49%, and we call it a normal
state. This is a persistent regime, and the probability of remaining in it is 98%. The last
regime captures market downturns and has a mean of -2.02% and a volatility of 4.51%. The
probability of remaining in this regime is 74%.
The model estimation allows us to infer when the S&P 500 was in one of the three regimes
for each date of the sample using the Hamilton ﬁlter and smoothing algorithms (Hamilton,
1994).
We observe that in the ﬁrst part of the sample, the S&P 500 returns are frequently
characterized by the normal regime 1, in particular from July 1994 to December 1996 (91.7%
of time in normal regime and 8.3% in the market downturn). The period from 1997 through
2003 is characterized primarily by two other regimes: up-market (30.4%) and down-market
(64.6%). This outcome is generated mainly by high instability of the ﬁnancial markets
starting from the Asian down-market in 1997, well captured by regime 2, the technology
and internet boom, well captured by regime 0, the Japanese down-market of March 2001,
September 11, 2001 and the market downturn of 2002 and 2003, captured mostly by regime
2. The last part of the sample from 2003 through 2005 is characterized by the normal regime
1 (100%). It is important to note that the three-regime approach does not imply simply
estimator and the robust covariance matrix estimator are similar.
7Goetzmann et al. (2007) show that an optimal strategy for hedge funds might be selling out-of-the-
money puts and calls, ensuring that during normal regimes, hedge fund managers obtain a positive cash
ﬂow, and have a large exposure in extreme events.
12splitting the data sample into large negative, large positives or close to the mean returns.
The regime approach allows us to capture periods where the return distribution belongs to
large volatility periods characterized by large downturns or more tranquil periods. In all
these diﬀerent regimes we may face positive or negative returns.8
In addition to analyzing the change in the S&P 500 returns, and probability of being in
a particular regime, we derive both conditional and unconditional distributions for the S&P
500 for all three regimes as well as for the total time series.
[INSERT Figure (1) about here]
Figure 1 depicts unconditional distributions of the S&P 500 overall, in down-market,
normal and up-market regimes. First, it is worthwhile to note that during the time period
analyzed in the paper, the market clearly experienced three distinct regimes: up-market,
normal and down-market. Moreover, the total distribution is skewed, and distribution of
being in a down-market state is characterized by fat tails. Figure 1 also depicts conditional
distributions of diﬀerent regimes, conditional on starting in regime 2, a down-market regime.
The resulting total distribution closely overlaps regime 2 distribution, especially in the left
tail. Therefore, once in down-market, the market is more likely to stay in down-market
(74%), and both conditional regime 2 and total distribution are fat-tailed.
[INSERT Figure (2) about here]
Figure 2 shows conditional distributions of the S&P 500 overall, in down-market, normal
and up-market regimes ﬁrst conditional on an up-market regime and second conditional on
a normal regime. Interestingly, conditional on being in an up-market, there is a certain
probability of staying in an up-market (28%), but there is also a large left-tail probability
of moving to a down-market (67%). It looks like the up-market regime is often transitory,
frequently followed by a down-market regime. Conditional on being in a normal regime,
the total distribution is almost identical to the conditional probability of a normal regime.
Therefore, if a market is in the normal regime, it is more likely to be persistent (98%). The
conditional distributions for all regimes are very close to normal in this case. Nevertheless,
there is a small probability of 2% of moving to an up-market regime that is more likely (67%)
followed by a down-market.
8This approach is closely compared to an alternative threshold approach where a sample is split into
positive and negative returns, following Fung and Hsieh (1997). These two approaches are carefully compared
in Section 6. More speciﬁcally, the regime-switching approach allows us to endogenously determine changes
in market return distributions without exogenously splitting the data into positive and negative returns.
13Overall, the results conﬁrm that during the period of January 1994 to March 2005, the
S&P 500 was clearly characterized by three separate regimes. In the paper, we are interested
in clearly understanding the exposure of each hedge fund strategy to the market in all these
regimes. In other words, we are interested in ﬁnding the exposure of hedge fund returns to all
parts of this distribution. Using the results in Figures 1 and 2, it is clear that not accounting
for three separate regimes and only concentrating on a normal regime will underestimate the
left tail of the distribution and thus bias hedge fund market risk exposure.
3.2.2 One-factor model
After having characterized the process for the S&P 500, we analyze the exposure of diﬀerent
hedge fund strategies to diﬀerent S&P 500 regimes. The analysis is based on the model
presented in equation 13 and results are shown in Table 3.
[INSERT Table (3) about here]
We ﬁnd diﬀerent factor loadings with respect to the S&P 500 regimes for almost all hedge
funds indexes. The only exception is the Convertible Bond Arbitrage strategy. Regarding
the more directional strategies (Dedicated Shortseller and Long/Short Equity), we do ﬁnd
signiﬁcant exposures to the S&P 500 regimes, but the factor loadings vary a lot for diﬀerent
regimes. In particular, Dedicated Shortseller shows a large negative exposure of -1.26 to
the S&P 500 in normal times. This relationship is maintained for the down-market period;
however, the exposure is reduced in half for the up-market state of the market. Long/Short
Equity strategy aims to go both long and short on the market during the normal regime.
Our analysis shows that the exposure to the market during the normal regime is three times
as high as the exposure during the other two regimes. There is, therefore, an attempt of
this strategy to reduce the exposure to the market downturns, but the exposure remains still
positive, as shown in Table 3.
The Emerging Markets strategy shows a peculiar positive exposure mostly when the
market is characterized by the down-market state and is relatively large in normal time. A
potential explanation of this large exposure in market downturns can come from the fact that
many emerging markets do not allow short-selling and lack availability of option instruments
to be used for hedging. Therefore, the exposure result for the Emerging Markets strategy is
similar to writing a put option on the S&P index.
For Equity Market Neutral we ﬁnd a positive exposure in regime 0, i.e., when the market
is rolling up. The exposure is zero in normal times and when the market is mostly charac-
terized by a downturn. This result is in line with the fact that the Market Neutral strategy
14can neutralize the eﬀects of normal movements of the market, but when the market is sud-
denly moving to another regime facing a phase-locking phenomenon, the exposure becomes
positive.
The other three strategies are related to the Event Driven categories. The exposures to
the S&P 500 are positive and quite similar in diﬀerent states of the market, especially for
the Event Driven Multi-Strategy, which has a slightly higher exposure during the market
downturn. Distressed security strategy presents a larger exposure in normal times. The Risk
Arbitrage Strategy presents a positive exposure in the normal regime and when the market
is rolling up and an almost zero exposure in the down-market regime.
In addition to showing that hedge fund exposure diﬀers over various market regimes, a
regime-switching framework allows us to calculate time-varying risk exposure of hedge funds
implied by the data, i.e., time-varying betas with respect to various factors including the
S&P 500 for various hedge fund strategies. Time-varying betas can be easily determined
using equation 11 by assuming that k=0. This gives us the framework for analyzing time-
varying risk exposures for hedge funds for diﬀerent factors. Time-varying market risk betas
are depicted for several hedge fund strategies in Figure 3.
[INSERT Figure (3) about here]
First, note that the market exposure changes over time for all strategies, conﬁrming that
hedge funds are implementing dynamic strategies. Figure 3 depicts the evolution of market
betas for Hedge fund index, Long/Short Equity and Emerging Markets strategies. For the
Hedge fund index and Long/Short Equity strategy, starting the middle of 2003, market
exposure dramatically increased. For example, for the Combined Hedge fund index, the
forecasted exposure in April 2003 was 0.07, seemingly market-neutral; however, exposure
in March 2005 increased to 0.37, which is a signiﬁcant positive market exposure. For the
same time period, the exposure of the Long/Short Equity increased from 0.20 to 0.64, more
than 3-fold.9 It is interesting to note that in all these categories, the market beta is cyclical:
it was increasing from 1994 through 1997, then it abruptly dropped and stayed low for 7
years, and started to increase in 2003. Similar behavior is also observed for Convertible
Bond Arbitrage, Risk Arbitrage, Distressed, and Dedicated Shortseller (for this strategy, the
exposure is increasing in the negative direction). This cyclical behavior in market beta can
be largely attributed to the changes in market regimes over this time period.10
9Long/Short Equity strategy comprises majority of hedge funds represented in the Combined Hedge fund
index.
10As stressed above, our analysis shows that in the ﬁrst part of the sample, from July 1994 to December
1996, the S&P 500 returns are frequently characterized by the normal regime 1. The period from 1997
15When volatility of the S&P 500 is high between 1997 and 2003, hedge funds in these
strategies on average decrease their exposure to the market and increase when volatility of
the market subsides (normal regime). Therefore, on average, when market volatility is high
and changing, hedge funds reduce exposure.
On another hand, time-varying beta for the Emerging Markets category shows a diﬀerent
story. For the Emerging Markets category, from 1997 to 2003, the exposure ﬂuctuates a lot,
from 0.2 to 0.5. However, from the beginning of 2003 to the end of the data sample, the
market exposure equilibrates at 0.41. The similar behavior is observed for Equity Market
Neutral strategy and for the Event Driven Multi-Strategy.
In summary, hedge fund exposure depends on volatility regimes of the S&P 500. More-
over, the exposure to the S&P 500 index changes through time. Therefore, investors should
take into account change in market volatility and how it aﬀects hedge fund risk. Regulators
should do stress testing with diﬀerent market conditions and consider the implications for
hedge fund behavior. This will contribute to the analysis of systemic risk.
This framework can be extended to calculating expected hedge fund exposures to diﬀerent
factors one month from now, 6 months from now, 1 year from now and so on. Our ﬂexible
approach allows us to calculate expected time-varying betas for t + k periods by using
speciﬁcation 11.
Idiosyncratic risk presents diﬀerent levels of volatility. Convertible Bond Arbitrage, Eq-
uity Market Neutral and Risk Arbitrage tend to have relatively low values of idiosyncratic
volatility for both volatility regimes. The idiosyncratic volatility in the high volatility regime
is always less than 2% for these strategies (Table 3). However, for the other ﬁve strategies, in
both regimes, the idiosyncratic volatility is relatively high. The average idiosyncratic volatil-
ity for a high volatility regime for these strategies is about 4% at the monthly level. More-
over, high volatility regimes are persistent. This is more evident for Dedicated Shortseller,
Emerging Markets, Equity Market Neutral and Long/Short Equity strategies. Controlling
for idiosyncratic risk is important for investors in terms of portfolio risk and diversiﬁcation,
and for regulators in controlling spill-over eﬀects that can propagate from the hedge fund
idiosyncratic risk.
Nevertheless, other risk factors play a role as important as the S&P 500 in characterizing
the time-varying hedge fund exposure. This aspect is investigated in the next section with
a multifactor model.
through 2003 is characterized primarily by two other regimes: up-market and down-market. The last part
of the sample from 2003 through 2005 is characterized by the normal regime.
163.2.3 Multifactor model
Multifactor model with non-linear exposure only to the S&P 500
As discussed above, other factors aﬀect hedge fund index returns, and this calls for the
use of a multifactor framework. We begin with a comprehensive set of risk factors that will
be candidates for each of the risk models, covering stocks, bonds, currencies, commodities,
emerging markets, momentum factor and volatility. These factors are presented in Table
4. They are also described by Chan et al. (2005) as relevant factors to be used for each
hedge fund strategy. Given the limited dataset, we use a step-wise approach to limit the
ﬁnal list of factors for our analysis. Employing a combination of statistical methods and
empirical judgement, we use these factors to estimate risk models for the 8 hedge fund
indexes. In all our analyses, hedge fund returns, S&P 500, USD, Lehman Government
Credit, Gold, MSCI Emerging Markets Bond Index, MSCI Emerging Markets Stocks Index
and Momentum French factor are used in excess of LIBOR returns.
[INSERT Table (4) about here]
We ﬁrst consider the model presented in equation (15) and the results for this model are
contained in Table 5. Here, we are considering linear factors: Large-Small, Value-Growth,
USD, Lehman Government Credit, Term Spread, change in VIX, Credit Spread, Gold, MSCI
Emerging Markets Bond Index, MSCI Emergent Markets Stock Index, Momentum French
factor and non-linear exposure to diﬀerent states of the S&P 500.11
[INSERT Table (5) about here]
The number of factors F selected for each risk model varies from a minimum of 2 for
Equity Market Neutral to a maximum of 8 for the Event Driven Multi-Strategy, not including
the S&P 500 index. This pattern is plausible because the Event Driven Multi-Strategy by
deﬁnition includes a broad set of strategies; hence a broad array of risk factors is needed to
capture the variation in this category versus other categories.
The statistical signiﬁcance of the factor loadings on the S&P 500 conditional on the
diﬀerent regimes is almost the same as the one obtained in the previous analysis with only
the S&P 500 risk factor. The only main diﬀerence is the exposure of the Distressed strategy
11Large-Small and Value-Growth factors are constructed using Russell indexes.
17in the up-market state to the S&P 500 and the exposure of the Emerging Markets strategy in
the up-market and normal states to the S&P 500. This indicates that the analysis performed
above is robust to the inclusion of other factors that may aﬀect hedge index returns.
Regarding the Large Minus Small factor, we observe that this factor is relevant for almost
all hedge fund strategies, the only exceptions are Equity Market Neutral and Emerging
Markets strategies. The exposure to the Large Minus Small factor is negative for almost all
hedge funds indexes (the only exception is the Dedicated Shortseller) suggesting that returns
of these hedge indexes resemble those achieved by going long on small stocks and short on
large stocks (as shown previously by Agarwal and Naik (2004) and Chan et al. (2005)).
Another potential explanation is that this factor is capturing liquidity risk as highlighted by
Amihud (2002) and Acharya et al. (2004). We consider this aspect later.
The hedge fund exposure to Value Minus Growth factor is positive for Convertible Bond
Arbitrage, Dedicated Shortseller, Distressed, Event Driven Multi-Strategy and Risk Arbi-
trage.12
Credit spread is a common negative factor for ﬁve out of eight strategies. This is of great
importance for regulators who are concerned about common risks among hedge funds. This
is particulary relevant given the recent credit crisis and its eﬀect on hedge funds (August
2007).
Change in VIX is only signiﬁcant for 2 strategies. This is surprising given that hedge
funds take bets on volatility. There could be two complementary reasons for this: (1)
Switching in S&P 500 regimes based on mean and volatility already captures this exposure,
and (2) Hedge funds take non-linear bets in volatility and thus the current linear change in
VIX exposure does not capture the true underlying non-linear exposure. However, if the ﬁrst
reason were the only true reason, then change in VIX will be captured by OLS; however, it
is not as will be shown in the robustness analysis. Therefore, later in the paper we introduce
models with omitted factors to capture non-linearity in VIX exposure.
A detailed analysis of other factors is presented in Appendix 1 for each hedge fund
strategy. The list of factors and hedge fund exposures to these factors is unique for each
strategy; therefore, we are analyzing them one by one for each strategy.
Multifactor model with non-linear exposure to all factors
Finally, we estimate the multifactor model speciﬁed in equation (17) and the results are
contained in Table 6. Here, we are considering non-linear exposure to factors: S&P 500,
12We also consider Fama and French “size” and “book-to-market” risk factors (Fama and French, 1993)
and the results are similar. We prefer to use the Large-Small and Value-Growth Russell indexes because
they are investable portfolios, following Chan et al. (2005).
18Large-Small, Value-Growth, USD, Lehman Government Credit, Term Spread, change in
VIX, Credit Spread, Gold, MSCI Emerging Markets Bond Index, MSCI Emerging Markets
Stock Index and Momentum factor. The three coeﬃcients that we estimate for each factor
represent the non-linear factor exposure of hedge fund indexes to the three states of the
S&P 500. Because of the limited dataset we only consider variables that are statistically
signiﬁcant in the previous multifactor linear exposure analysis. Clearly, the results may
depend on this choice, thus later we relax this assumption and consider the possibility of a
non-linear exposure to other risk factors as well (see section 4).
[INSERT Table (6) about here]
All strategies have exposure to the S&P 500 in at least one regime even after accounting
for conditional exposure to other risk factors. Generally, we ﬁnd that the model that ac-
counts for diﬀerent factors conditional on the state of the market is richer and captures more
exposures compared to previous models. Moreover, the model shows that factor exposure is
changing conditional on the state of the market. Finally, this model captures more of hedge
fund return variation as is evidenced by a higher pseudo-R2 for all hedge fund strategies
compared to the one-factor model and the multifactor model with non-linear exposure only
to the S&P 500.
For ﬁve out of eight strategies (Convertible Bond Arbitrage, Long/Short Equity, Dis-
tressed, Event-Driven Multi Strategy and Risk Arbitrage) our results suggests that hedge
funds tend to hold illiquid or low-credit securities and thus are susceptible to liquidity crises.13
We ﬁnd that in all of these strategies, exposure to LS (Large-Small) is negative and highly
signiﬁcant during market downturn. In all these cases (except Long/Short Equity) the ex-
posure is higher in absolute value compared to the exposure to LS during the normal market
conditions.14 Actually, for Convertible Bond Arbitrage, Event-Driven Multi-Strategy and
Risk Arbitrage, the exposure to LS during normal market conditions is negligible. Overall,
almost all hedge fund indexes have a signiﬁcant exposure to the LS factor in at least two out
of three states and especially during market downturn.
Furthermore, note that LS is the only common factor in the market downturn for six
out of eight hedge funds strategies and for ﬁve out of eight it has the same sign. This
13For Dedicated Shortseller the exposure to LS is positive. The strategy makes money in the down-state
of the market; therefore, the shock in the down-state will be beneﬁcial for this strategy.
14The Long/Short Equity strategy is the only strategy compared, to the other four, which holds relatively
liquid and higher-credit securities.
19result suggests that this variable may potentially capture a common factor in the hedge fund
industry. A potential explanation of this result is that liquidity risk is relevant for hedge funds
and liquidity shocks are highly episodic and tend to be preceded by or associated with large
and negative asset return shocks, whereby liquidity risk is rendered a particularly non-linear
phenomenon. This result is in line with the potential interpretation of Acharya and Schaefer
(2006) that the “illiquidity” prices in capital markets exhibit diﬀerent regimes. In a normal
regime, intermediaries, including hedge funds, are well capitalized and liquidity eﬀects are
minimal. In the “illiquidity” regime usually related to market downturns, intermediaries are
close to their risk or collateral constraints and there is a “cash-in-the-market” pricing (Allen
and Gale (1994, 1998)). In this framework, hedge funds, which often invest in derivatives and
complex structured products, are more likely to be the marginal price setters and therefore
more largely aﬀected by the “illiquidity” regime.
Moreover, we ﬁnd that another common risk factor for hedge funds is Credit Spread,
especially the eﬀect of the Credit Spread in the negative states of the market. For most
of the strategies (Convertible Bond Arbitrage, Equity Market Neutral, Long/Short Equity,
Distressed and Event-Driven Multi Strategy), the impact of the Credit Spread in the down-
market regime on hedge fund index returns is negative.15 The credit risk in the down-state
of the market is the most important risk factor that should be controlled by regulators.
Moreover, credit spread can also serve as a proxy for illiquidity risk. When credit spread
increases, cost of capital increases and investors prefer to invest in more liquid and high-
quality instruments. Therefore, low-credit illiquid investments suﬀer.
Furthermore, our analysis shows that many factor exposures are characterized by the
phase-locking property. For example, the exposure to the S&P 500 is negligible during
normal states of the market for the Convertible Bond Arbitrage, Equity Market Neutral,
Event Driven Multi-Strategy and Risk Arbitrage, but changes to positive in up- and down-
states of the market. Also, the exposure to Lehman Government Credit is negligible for
Convertible Bond Arbitrage, Emerging Markets and Long/Short Equity indexes; however,
it becomes highly positive and signiﬁcant for up- and down-market states. The exposure
to UMD is negligible in the normal state of the market for Emerging Markets, Long/Short
Equity and Event Driven Multi-Strategy, but becomes highly positive and signiﬁcant in the
up- and down-states.
Nevertheless, the phase-locking phenomenon could be produced by dynamic strategies
and/or a factor exposure of hedge fund asset portfolio that becomes statistically relevant
only in certain states. With our approach we are not able to distinguish among the two
15The introduction of CS for the Equity Market Neutral strategy is in Section 4 and in Table 7 where we
relax the assumption of factors chosen strictly by the step-wise linear analysis.
20phenomena and simply capture the total exposure that arises from both dynamic strategies
and asset portfolio non-linear exposures.
In Appendix 2 we consider each strategy separately and address time-varying risk expo-
sures for various factors.
As a robustness check, we test whether statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcients are also statis-
tically diﬀerent from each other. We investigate this aspect for diﬀerent hedge fund indexes,
and indeed for some coeﬃcients we cannot reject the hypothesis that they are equal. Never-
theless, even if some of the estimated coeﬃcients are similar, we are able to ﬁnd that some
of them are statistically equal only in two of the three states. This conﬁrms that factor
exposures change conditional on diﬀerent states.
It is important to underline that our results may suﬀer due to data limitation. How-
ever, we still ﬁnd convincing evidence that factor exposures are diﬀerent for various factors
conditional on the state of the market and for diﬀerent hedge fund indexes. Moreover, the
model shows that factor exposure is changing conditional on the volatility of the market
risk factor. This conﬁrms our initial hypothesis that the exposures to diﬀerent risk factors
are time-varying and conditional on the state of the market risk factor. Indeed, for many
factors we observe that the risk exposure is zero during normal times, and suddenly becomes
positive or of opposite sign during market downturns characterized by high volatility.
4 Omitted Factors
The step-wise linear approach was used to limit the ﬁnal list of factors for the analysis in
the multifactor models with linear and non-linear exposures (Tables 5 and 6). However,
the step-wise linear analysis uses linear models and might miss several risk factors that can
impact the return proﬁle of hedge fund strategies.
Speciﬁcally, the step-wise linear analysis could miss exposures that are only present
during market downturns, exposures related to liquidity events and low-probability events
or exposures with diﬀerent signs for diﬀerent regimes. In this section we attempt to account
for the omitted factors and perform several analyses of potential non-linear risk exposures not
highlighted in previous sections. Speciﬁcally, we are considering factors that were originally
eliminated by the step-wise linear procedure and are not considered in Tables 5 and 6.
Our analysis in Table 7 shows that the change in VIX is an omitted factor for most of the
strategies. For these strategies VIX is important, as the return process of these strategies
is related to market volatility. For example, convertible bonds contain imbedded equity call
21options that allow investors to convert the bonds into shares if the underlying share price
rises.
[INSERT Table (7) about here]
Change in VIX is a variable that needs to be interpreted jointly with diﬀerent regimes of
the S&P 500. For the Convertible Bond Arbitrage strategy, the eﬀect of Change in VIX is
negative in crises markets (-0.08) and positive in up-markets (0.05).
The relationship between a convertible bond price and stock price is concave when stock
price is low (down-market) and highly convex when the stock price is high (up-market).
Therefore, in the up-market, we expect change in volatility to attribute to additional returns
of the strategy, and in down-markets, the change in volatility negatively aﬀects the returns
of the strategy.
For Risk Arbitrage, the exposure to change in VIX is positive and signiﬁcant, especially
during normal periods (0.09), but negative during down-market periods (-0.12).
Risk Arbitrage strategy is concerned with the success of a merger, and increase in volatil-
ity in down-times often signals an increase in probability of failure. The same applies to
Distressed strategies (-0.22 in down-state and 0.24 in the normal state).
Another example is the eﬀect of change in VIX for the Dedicated Shortseller strategy.
We ﬁnd that the exposure to the change in VIX is highly positive only in the negative market
state (0.27), but negative in all other states (-0.42 for up-state and -0.27 for normal state).
In this case the exposure to the change in VIX is opposite to the other strategies, possibly
due to the nature of the strategy that proﬁts from negative volatility shocks to the market.
In all of these cases, exposures to the change in VIX have opposite signs and similar
magnitudes for down and normal markets; and this is the main reason why linear factors are
not able to capture this exposure.
Credit Spread and Term Spread were irrelevant factors for Equity Market Neutral strategy
and were not considered in the models (Tables 5 and 6). In Table 7 we explicitly considered
these factors. We ﬁnd that in normal conditions, Credit Spread is irrelevant for Equity
Market Neutral strategy. However, in downturns of the market, it is highly negative and
signiﬁcant (-1.75, t-stat: -2.39). This again conﬁrms that credit risk is the common factor
across diﬀerent hedge fund strategies.
In the previous models, we found that neither LS nor change in VIX were relevant for the
Emerging Markets strategy. However, after explicitly accounting for change in VIX for this
22strategy, we ﬁnd that change in VIX is signiﬁcant for the up-market and normal regime and
exposure to the LS factor is negative and signiﬁcant in normal and down-market periods.
In conclusion, we ﬁnd that using linear models and a step-wise linear approach of nar-
rowing down signiﬁcant factors misses several factors for hedge fund analysis. On average,
the eﬀect of a factor can be negligible; however, this is due to lumping the eﬀect of the factor
instead of separately calculating exposures in up-market, down-market and normal states.
We ﬁnd that often exposures during normal and down-markets are of opposite signs, and
often, the exposures during normal states are not signiﬁcant from zero. Therefore, if we do
not separate the factor eﬀects into diﬀerent market regimes, we underestimate the real hedge
fund exposure to this factor.
We ﬁnd that change in VIX is important for hedge fund strategies, and, speciﬁcally, the
exposure of hedge fund strategies to the change in VIX is non-linear and depends on the
state of the market. Moreover, we ﬁnd that exposures to several factors, such as LS and
Credit Spread, are highly negative for most of strategies in the down-market state. We argue
that this exposure could be related to liquidity risk and credit risk, but a deep analysis of
this issue is needed and is left to further investigation.
5 Idiosyncratic Risk Factor
In addition to the derivation of the expected market exposures, the switching regime beta
model allows us to separate and show the evolution of the idiosyncratic risk of hedge funds.
In particular, our estimation of the Markov chain for the idiosyncratic risk of hedge funds
shows that the idiosyncratic risk is characterized by two diﬀerent regimes with high and
low volatility for 6 of the 8 strategies. Exceptions are Distressed and Dedicated Shortseller,
which are always characterized by a large volatility regime (idiosyncratic volatility is 1.36%
for Distressed and 2.31% for Dedicated Shortseller, Table 6). These monthly volatilities are
in-line with high volatility regimes for other strategies. The volatility parameters in the two
volatility regimes (high and low) are largely diﬀerent, and the idiosyncratic risk factor of all
6 strategies shows that the volatility in the high regime is at least twice the volatility in the
low volatility regime of the idiosyncratic risk (see in Table 6 for values of  0 and  1.)
The estimated probability of switching from one regime to another is on average about
10%, but the probability of remaining in the same regime is about 90%, meaning that
volatility regimes are quite persistent.
The estimations of the coeﬃcients and the evolution of the probability of being in the high
volatility regime for the idiosyncratic risk factor are similar across three models described in
23equations 2, 13 and 17. This means that we are consistently estimating the idiosyncratic risk
factor and it makes our results robust to diﬀerent speciﬁcations. Therefore, we only depict
results for the model described in equation 17.
Referring to the model estimation presented in Table 6, in Figures 4 and 5 we show the
evolution of the probability of being in the high volatility regime for all 6 strategies.
[INSERT Figure(4) about here]
[INSERT Figure(5) about here]
Figures 4 and 5 plot monthly probabilities from January 1994 to March 2005 of hedge
fund indexes facing a high volatility regime for the idiosyncratic risk factor, i.e., volatility
of the hedge fund indexes not related to the volatility of the S&P 500 index and other risk
factors. We see that the evolution of the volatility of diﬀerent strategies is quite diﬀerent.
In particular, we observe that Long/Short Equity and Emerging Markets indexes present
a low probability of being in the high volatility regime in the last part of the sample and
a high probability in the middle of the sample that corresponds to the series of crises and
rallies from 1997 till 2001. Therefore, the risk faced by the S&P 500 already captured by the
switching beta is ampliﬁed in the middle of the sample for these strategies. This indicates
not only that the link with the S&P 500 is changing, but also that the idiosyncratic risk of
the hedge fund indexes may switch to the high-volatility regime at the same time when the
market is characterized by turbulence. This can be explained by omitted or latent variables
such as idiosyncratic liquidity risk or factors that aﬀect mostly the hedge fund industry (as in
the case of LTCM default). For example, Emerging Markets, Event Driven Multi-Strategy,
Long/Short Equity and Risk Arbitrage are all related to diﬀerent liquidity events more or
less related to the LTCM crisis.
Event Driven Multi-Strategy is almost always characterized by the low volatility regime
for its idiosyncratic risk factor; however, the probability of a high volatility regime greatly
increases for periods characterized by high illiquidity events and other unexpected shocks not
correlated with market returns. For example, in February 1994, the U.S. Federal Reserve
started a tightening cycle that caught many hedge funds by surprise, causing signiﬁcant
dislocation in bond markets worldwide; the end of 1994 witnessed the start of the “Tequila
Crisis” in Mexico; in August 1998, Russia defaulted on its government debt and LTCM
collapsed leading to a liquidity crunch in worldwide ﬁnancial markets; the ﬁrst quarter of
242000 saw a crash of the Internet boom, and in the middle of 2002 there was a drying out of
merger activities, a decrease in defaults and the release of news about WorldCom accounting
problems. During all of these periods, the probability of a high volatility regime skyrocketed,
reaching 1 for the LTCM and the Russian default crisis.
The most interesting indicator is the evolution of being in the high volatility regime by
the Convertible Bond Arbitrage index that indicates that the strategy has moved to a large
volatility regime from the end of 2003 and is still characterized by this regime at the end
of the sample considered (March 2005). If we jointly consider the state of the market index
(tranquil normal period in the last two years of the sample) and the state of the idiosyncratic
risk factor for the Convertible Bond Arbitrage index, we see that the switching regime beta
model is able to disentangle whether the source of risk is characterized by market conditions
or by potential distress in the hedge fund index strategy. Not surprisingly, April 2005 (not in
the sample period) saw extremely low returns and high liquidations in the Convertible Bond
Arbitrage sector. Merely tracking market exposure will not lead to this predictive result.
We further explore the probability that all hedge fund strategies exhibit idiosyncratic
risk in a high volatility regime. This could be interpreted as a proxy measure for contagion
between diﬀerent hedge fund strategies. Speciﬁcally, we calculate the joint ﬁltered probability
of being in a high volatility state for all hedge funds and plot them in Figure 6. We ﬁnd
that the joint ﬁltered probability jumps from approximately 0% in May 1998 to 4% in June
1998 to 13% in July 1998 to 96% in August 1998, the month of the LTCM collapse. It
started to subside in October 1998. The peak in the joint probability coincides with the
liquidity crisis precipitated by the collapse of LTCM.16 The results suggest that the LTCM
crisis not only aﬀected market risk factors, but also, after controlling for market and other
factor exposures, aﬀected idiosyncratic volatility of hedge funds. This provides evidence that
even after accounting for market and other factor exposures, the LTCM crisis precipitated
contagion across the hedge fund industry. In our data, we found that this was the only case
where the joint probability of being in a high volatility state for all hedge funds spiked and
approached one.
[INSERT Figure(6) about here]
16We check this result against a possibility that randomly we can have all eight strategies exhibiting high
volatility regimes at the same time.
256 Robustness Analysis
6.1 Comparison with OLS Regression
In a multifactor setting, we consider the model presented in equation (15) and the results
for this model are contained in Table 5.
The natural way to test the regime-switching model is to compare its results to those
obtained using OLS regression. The results for the OLS regression are presented in Table
8. They are consistent, meaning, that factor loadings have the same sign in both models;
however, the regime-switching model is clearly superior based on pseudo-R2 metric.17
For each hedge fund index, pseudo-R2 is larger for regime-switching models compared to
OLS models. Moreover, several estimates that are signiﬁcant in the regime-switching model
are not signiﬁcant for the OLS model. OLS is missing some factor exposure and does not
take into account time-variability of risk factors based on market conditions.
[INSERT Table (8) about here]
6.2 Asymmetric Beta and Threshold Models
An alternative way to study time-varying non-linear hedge fund exposure to market factors
is through an asymmetric beta model. In this model, the distribution of Rt is truncated
either at the median or zero and betas for “up or down” markets are compared. This ap-
proach has been applied to hedge funds in Agarwal and Naik (2004), Mitchell and Pulvino
(2001), Asness, Krail and Liew (2004) and Chan et al. (2005). The authors found signiﬁcant
diﬀerences between “up” and “down” betas. Speciﬁcally, they found Event-Driven types
of strategies including Risk Arbitrage, Distressed and Event-Driven Multi-Strategy exhibit
zero correlation with up-market conditions, but a large positive exposure during down-market
conditions. Emerging Markets strategy shows a much higher down-market correlation com-
pared to up-market. Moreover, authors ﬁnd that the Equity-Market Neutral strategy has a
17It is important to note that a pseudo-R2 only has meaning when compared to another pseudo-R2 of
the same type, on the same data, and predicting the same outcome. In this situation, a higher pseudo-R2
indicates which model is preferable.
26much higher up-market beta compared to the down-market beta. We replicate the analysis
and ﬁnd identical results in our analysis.18
We further extend the asymmetric beta model and develop a threshold model allowing for
three states. Speciﬁcally, we look at asymmetric betas in hedge fund exposure by specifying
diﬀerent beta coeﬃcients for down-markets, normal markets and up-markets. Speciﬁcally,
consider the following regression:




































It if It ≤ µ + σ
0 otherwise
(21)
where It is the return on the index, µ is the mean and σ is its standard deviation.





t , the standard linear model in which fund i’s market betas are






i . The speciﬁcation (20) essentially tries to capture asymmetries in
the index exposures.
Unlike the asymmetric model, a regime-switching model allows for endogenous deﬁnition
of expected returns and volatilities deﬁned from the data. The regime-switching model
also does not switch as often as the asymmetric model. Moreover, the regime-switching
model may include positive returns for the down-market state and negative returns for the
up-market state.
Using the speciﬁcation (20), we regress hedge fund returns on the S&P 500 index dur-
ing up (I
+
t ), normal (I0
t ) and down (I
−
t ) conditions. The results are reported in Table 8.
Beta asymmetries are quite pronounced especially, for Emerging Markets, Distressed, Event
Driven Multi-Strategy and Risk Arbitrage. For example, the Distressed index has an up-
market beta of 0.07 (not signiﬁcant)—seemingly market neutral—however, its down-market
beta is 0.38! The exposure of the Convertible Bond Arbitrage strategy to the S&P 500 is
negligible for both up and down-markets; therefore, a more comprehensive model is needed
to measure the exposure of this style.
18Results are not presented here but are available upon request.
27[INSERT Table (8) about here]
The results using the threshold model are similar to the ones obtained using the regime-
switching methodology presented in Table 3. However, there are several numerical dif-
ferences. For example, the regime-switching methodology ﬁnds that the Market-Neutral
strategy has market-neutral exposure in all states except an up-market state. However,
the threshold methodology ﬁnds positive market exposure in up (I
+
t ) and down (I
−
t ) states.
Regime-switching methodology also identiﬁes a positive market exposure in the “up-market”
state for the Emerging Markets strategy, whereas the threshold methodology misses this
link.
Comparing (Table 9 and Table 5), we observe that regime-switching model ﬁts data much
better than the threshold or asymmetric beta models. For example, for all styles, pseudo-
R2 for regime-switching models exceeds pseudo-R2 for threshold models, and in particular
improves model ﬁt for Convertible Bond Arbitrage, Equity Market Neutral and Event Driven
Multi-Strategy. Therefore, the regime-switching models are able to capture linkages between
hedge fund returns and the S&P 500 that are not possible to analyze by simply splitting
past returns in diﬀerent return quintiles. Moreover, asymmetric and threshold models have
exogenous deﬁnitions of a state. On the other hand, regime-switching methodology allows
for a ﬂexible endogenous deﬁnition of a state and is able to categorize state distributions in
terms of means and variances. This cannot been done with either asymmetric or threshold
models. Based on this evidence, we conclude that regime-switching methodology is superior
to threshold and asymmetric models for our analysis.
6.3 Data Smoothing and Illiquidity Eﬀect
As shown by Getmansky et al. (2004), observed hedge fund returns are biased by per-
formance smoothing and illiquidity, leading to autocorrelation of hedge fund returns on a
monthly basis. Following the approach of Getmansky et al. (2004), we de-smooth returns
using the following procedure:
Denote by Rt the true economic return of a hedge fund in period t, and let Rt satisfy the
following single linear factor model:
Rt = µ + βΛt +  t , E[Λt]=E [  t]=0 ,  t , Λt ∼ IID (22a)
Var[Rt] ≡ σ
2 . (22b)
28True returns represent the ﬂow of information that would determine the equilibrium value
of the fund’s securities in a frictionless market. However, true economic returns are not
observed. Instead, Ro
t denotes the reported or observed return in period t, and let
R
o
t = θ0 Rt + θ1 Rt−1 + ··· + θk Rt−k (23)
θj ∈ [0,1] ,j =0 ,...,k (24)
1=θ0 + θ1 + ··· + θk (25)
which is a weighted average of the fund’s true returns over the most recent k+1 periods,
including the current period. Similar to the Getmansky et al. (2004) model, we estimate
MA(2) model where k=2 using maximum likelihood method.
[INSERT Table (10) about here]
In line with this approach we determine Ro
t, i.e., “real returns” and estimate our models
on the real returns. The results in Table 10 show that indeed there is evidence of data
smoothing, but the estimated exposure to the diﬀerent factors conditional on the states of
the market are largely unaﬀected by the smoothing phenomenon.19
6.4 Single Hedge Funds Exposure
We investigate whether the exposures we observe on hedge fund indexes are in line with
those we may ﬁnd for single hedge funds in order to determine the degree of heterogeneity of
hedge funds within each index and its eﬀect on factor exposures. We randomly select diﬀerent
hedge funds for all categories and repeat all analyses described in the paper. Results show
that exposures of single hedge funds to various factors are in line with index exposures.20
19We also estimate the following model for real returns and compare the estimates using the observed
returns: Rt = α(Zt)+β(St)It +
 K
k=1 θkFkt + ω(Zt)ut,I t = µ(St)+σ(St) t. We also show that there is
indeed evidence of data smoothing; however, the estimated exposure to diﬀerent factors is largely not aﬀected
by smoothing. Results are available on request.
20Detailed results for all models and for all individual hedge funds in each category are available upon
request.
296.5 Normality of Residuals Test
One of the reasons for introducing a regime-switching approach is to address non-normality
in observed hedge fund index returns. If a regime-switching approach accurately describes
the return process of hedge fund indexes, then we expect residuals in the regime-switching
models to be normally distributed. Therefore, we implement Jarque-Bera test, which is
a goodness-of-ﬁt measure of departure from normality, based on the sample kurtosis and
skewness.21
[INSERT Table (11) about here]
Table 11 presents results for the Jarque-Bera normality tests. In the original data, nor-
mality test was rejected for all strategies except the Market Neutral strategy.22 We observe
that for 4 of hedge fund indexes normality test is rejected for a linear model like OLS.
Therefore, residuals in the OLS regression are normally distributed for four strategies.
We then consider the residuals obtained with the regime-switching methodology. We
analyze the residuals of two models: a multifactor model with non-linear exposure only to
the S&P 500 factor presented in equation (15) for which results are contained in Table 5, and
a multifactor model with non-linear exposure to all factors presented in equation (17) for
which results are presented in Table 6. There is an improvement using the regime-switching
model based only on the S&P 500 factor loading (normality test is rejected for 3 out of
8 strategies). Moreover, even if we observe a rejection of normality, based on p-values,
there is a strong improvement in the direction of normality, i.e., Jarque-Bera statistic is
lower than for residuals obtained from the original data and the OLS model in all cases.
We see a great improvement in normality of residuals for the more elaborate model which
accounts for non-linearity in all factors (equation (17)). Normality is accepted for 6 out
of 8 strategies. Therefore, based on the improvement in normality in our results, we show
that regime-switching models are able to capture non-linear properties of original hedge fund
index series. Nevertheless, there is still space for improvement, since for two hedge funds
strategies normality test is still rejected.




4 ), where S is the skewness, K
is the kurtosis, n is the number of observations, and k is the number of estimated coeﬃcients used to create
the series. The statistic has an asymptotic chi-squared distribution with two degrees of freedom and can be
used to test the null hypothesis that the data are from a normal distribution.
22Market Neutral strategy is the oldest hedge fund strategy. This investment strategy aims to produce
almost the same proﬁt regardless of market circumstances, often by taking a combination of long and short
positions. It is not designed to use options or other non-linear instruments.
307 Out-of-Sample Analysis of Hedge Fund Risk Expo-
sure
In this section we conduct an out-of-sample analysis of hedge fund risk exposures.
Hedge fund risk exposures were estimated in-sample, and the validity of these risk expo-
sures is analyzed in out-of-sample data of 2 years.
If risk exposures do not underlie the true return generating processes of hedge funds, then
the out-of-sample analysis of hedge fund returns and risk using in-sample risk exposures will
not conform with reality. However, if risk exposures estimated in-sample represent the true
economic risks of various hedge fund strategies, then these risk exposures can indeed track
the out-of-sample returns and risk of hedge fund strategies. Moreover, we calculate VaR for
each hedge fund strategy and evaluate the ability of our multifactor regime-switching beta
(MRSB) model to capture negative tail risks for these hedge fund strategies.
7.1 Out-of-sample Mimicking Performance
In order to access the validity of our risk model, we follow the approach introduced by
Agarwal and Naik (2004). Speciﬁcally, we construct a replicating portfolio for each hedge
fund index strategy using the factor loadings obtained from our multifactor regime-switching
beta model (MRSB). We compute the diﬀerence between the monthly return on the hedge
fund index and that of the replicating portfolio. Speciﬁcally, at each time t, factor loadings
are estimated, and are combined with the value of the risk factors at t + 1 to construct
returns of the replicating portfolio.23
We use an out-of-sample of 24 observations (from November 2004 to October 2006)
and therefore this procedure is repeated 24 times. We further conduct standard tests on the
signiﬁcance of the mean diﬀerence between the actual hedge fund index returns and replicated
portfolios. Speciﬁcally, we calculate a model performance measure: Mean Absolute Error
(MAE). We use this measure to compare the following models: OLS, Random Walk (RW),
multifactor regime-switching beta (MRSB), and multifactor regime-switching beta estimated
on “real” hedge fund index returns that are adjusted for autocorrelation (MRSB AR). We
report the results in Table 12 Panel A.
[INSERT Table (12) Panel A about here]
23The information set for the risk factors uses t+1 information in order not to introduce estimation errors
in the value of risk factors. Thus, we estimate conditionally on risk factor data.
31We ﬁnd that for all the eight strategies considered either the MSRB or the MSRB-AR
have smaller MAE compared to OLS and RW models. This provides evidence that the
portfolio based on risk exposures estimated through regime-switching models does a better
job in replicating hedge fund returns during the out-of-sample period compared to OLS and
RW models. This suggests that regime-switching models are able to capture the dominant
systematic risk exposures of hedge funds.
7.2 Negative tail risk exposure
A second out-of-sample analysis that we perform in this section highlights the ability of the
regime-switching approach to account for negative tail risk and therefore downside risk. In
line with the recommendation of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1995, 2006)
and current practice, we use the Value at Risk (VaR) to measure downside risk.
7.2.1 VaR deﬁnition
Value-at-Risk is a measure of market risk for a portfolio of ﬁnancial assets. In its general
formulation, VaR is the measure of the level of loss that a portfolio W could lose, with a
given degree of conﬁdence a, over a given time horizon h. Analytically it can be formulated
as follows:
Pr[Wt+h − Wt < −Va R W(h)] = a (26)
where Wt is the portfolio value at time t, and Va R W(h) is the VaR value of the portfolio
W with a time horizon of h. The conﬁdence level (1 − a) is typically chosen to be at least
95% and often as high as 99% and more (a equal to 5% or 1%, respectively). It is possible
to express the VaR measure in terms of return of the portfolio instead of portfolio value.
Analytically it can be formulated as follows:
Pr[RWt+h < −Va R R(h)] = a (27)
where RWt+h is the portfolio return at time t+h and Va R R(h) is the VaR value of portfolio
return RW with a time horizon of h. Statistically, VaR estimation corresponds to a speciﬁc
quantile of a portfolio’s potential loss distribution over a given holding period. Let us
assume that RWt ∼ ft, where ft is a general return distribution. For each model m (i.e.,
OLS and MSRB), the VaR for time t+h, conditional on the information available at time t
32is estimated.24 We denote this VaR estimate as Va R m(h,a), which corresponds to the point
in fm,t+h return distribution at its lower a percent tail. That is, Va R m(h,a) is the solution
to:
  Va R m(h,a)
−∞
fm,t+h(x)dx = a (28)
In our framework, the key aspect we would like to highlight is the ability of regime-switching
models to capture tail risk rather than measure the size of this risk. For this reason, if
risk exposures estimated in-sample represent the true economic risks of various hedge fund
strategies, then these risk exposures can indeed account for the out-of-sample losses (down-
side risk), i.e., the maximum loss the strategy can generate at a certain conﬁdence level. As
before, we concentrate the out-of-sample analysis on factor loadings and idiosyncratic risk
and assume that factor values are known. We thus perform VaR analysis conditional on the
information available at time t for factor loadings and distribution of idiosyncratic risk and
on information at t + 1 for the value of the factors. We follow Billio and Pelizzon (2000) to
calculate VaR.25 For OLS we use the factor loadings to determine the mean and standard
errors of the residuals of the model to calculate standard deviation. For each month in the 24
months of out-of-sample data, VaR estimates are calculated. Table 12 presents the average
of these VaR estimates.
[INSERT Table (12) about here]
We consider three conﬁdence levels 95%, 99% and 99.5%. As the table shows, the VaR
levels are quite diﬀerent for various strategies and may diﬀer quite a bit between Multifactor
Regime-Switching Beta (MRSB) and OLS models. One key aspect that needs to be consid-
ered is that the numbers shown are averages and therefore are not capturing the dynamic
risk evolution trough time. To account for time-varying property of VaR, we depict the
evolution of VaR for one strategy: Emerging Markets for the two models (MRSB and OLS).
[INSERT Figure (7) about here]
24As in the construction of the replicating portfolios, the information set for the risk factors uses t +1
information. Therefore, we work conditionally on risk factor data.
25More precisely, we estimate the model with data till t and use the forecasting probability Prob(St+1|Rt)
to obtain the factor loading and the distribution of the idiosyncratic risk.
33As Figure 7 shows, the Multifactor Regime-Switching Beta (MRSB) model closely cap-
tures downside risk of the strategy compared to the OLS model.26 Moreover, this model is
able to take into account the impact of the idiosyncratic risk factor on the downside risk of
the hedge fund strategy.27
Overall, out-of-sample forecasting tests conﬁrm the economic importance of accounting
for the presence of market regimes in determining hedge funds risk exposure.
8 Conclusion
In this paper we characterized the exposure of hedge fund indexes to risk factors using
switching regime beta models. This approach allows us to analyze time-varying risk exposure
and the phase-locking phenomenon for hedge funds. In particular, the changes in hedge fund
exposure to various risk factors explicitly account for the change in volatility of the market
risk factor.
We have three main results. First, hedge funds exhibit signiﬁcant non-linear exposure
not only to the market risk factor but also to Fama and French’s (1993) size and value
factors, bonds, currencies, commodities, volatility, credit and term spreads. In particular,
we show that exposures can be strongly diﬀerent in the down-market and up-market regimes
compared to normal times, suggesting that risk exposures of hedge funds in the down-market
regimes are quite diﬀerent than those faced during normal regimes. Moreover, many risk
factor exposures can only be captured with the switching regime analysis because for many
factors the exposures exhibit a phase-locking characteristic where in the normal regime the
exposure is zero and in market downturn it is statistically diﬀerent than zero or there is a
change in the sign of the exposure.
Second, we ﬁnd that Credit Spread, Large-Small and change in VIX are common hedge
fund factors in the down-state of the market, suggesting that these factors are important
in accessing hedge fund risk especially in the down-state of the market. Speciﬁcally, in
the market downturn regime six out of eight strategies are all negatively and signiﬁcantly
exposed to the Large-Small risk factor (this represents 84% of hedge funds in the sample).
This feature is important in light of the results of Acharya and Petersen (2005) that the
size risk factor is capturing liquidity risk. Moreover, considering that liquidity shocks are
highly episodic and tend to be preceded by or associated with large and negative asset return
shocks, our results indeed suggest that liquidity is a risk factor for hedge fund returns and
26Other strategies show qualitatively similar results.
27The determination of the minimum return with a certain conﬁdence level determined by OLS is rather
static and is primarily driven by the standard deviation of the standard errors.
34needs further investigation.
Third, the extension of the regime switching model to allow for non-linearity in residuals
suggests that switching regime models are able to capture and forecast the evolution of the
idiosyncratic risk factor in terms of changes from a low volatility regime to a distressed
state not directly related to market risk factors. In particular, our analysis shows that the
Convertible Bond Arbitrage distress observed recently is not related to a particular regime
of the market index or some other systemic risk factor, but to a switch in the volatility of
the idiosyncratic risk factor for this category. Our sample does not include the period of
distress in the Convertible Bond Arbitrage strategy; however, the model forecasted that in
the beginning of 2004 this strategy would enter a challenging period, characterized by an
increased volatility.
Moreover, we have allowed for a possibility and found evidence that all hedge fund strate-
gies exhibit idiosyncratic risk in a high volatility regime during the sample considered. We
ﬁnd that for almost all of the sample the joint probability of high idiosyncratic volatility for
all hedge funds is approximately zero, but there are three months among the 135 considered
where we ﬁnd that the joint probability that all hedge funds are in the high idiosyncratic
volatility regime is close to 1: at the LTCM crash. This provides evidence that even after
accounting for market and other factor exposures, the LTCM crisis precipitated contagion
across the hedge fund industry. This is the only crisis event that generated this result, even
though the market was characterized by other crises in the sample considered.
Finally, we ﬁnd that the regime switching approach explains the data better than the
asymmetric or the threshold beta approach largely used in the literature and it is robust
even after controlling for the data smoothing and illiquidity eﬀects.
The main goal of the paper is to analyze hedge fund risk. We provide a robust framework
that can be used by investors and regulators to assess this risk. The framework can be
used by investors for portfolio allocation and risk assessment, portfolio construction, risk
management, and benchmark design. Regulators, on the other hand, can use this framework
for stress testing and endogenously consider the eﬀect of switching volatility of market factor
and switching volatility of idiosyncratic risk on the overall risk hedge fund industry may face.
Regulators are particularly interested in identifying common risk factors, especially in the
down-state of the market. Our analysis suggests that they can use this framework to create
“early warning indicators” for potential changes in risk exposure of hedge funds and increase
in volatility of the hedge fund industry. This can help address regulators’ concern regarding
the potential risk hedge funds may pose for stability of ﬁnancial markets.
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Min Med Max  Skew  Kurt  JB  Stat. p-value 
Conv. Bond Arb  135 0.04 3.24 4.71 -5.29 0.59 3.04 -1.43 6.63  119.96  0.00 
Dedicated Shortseller  135 -0.89 -6.48 17.63 -9.29 -0.95 22.06 0.83  4.84 34.58 0.00 
Emerging Markets  135 0.54 3.12 16.97  -23.68 0.83 15.92 -0.65 7.13  105.21  0.00 
Equity Mkt Neutral  135 0.07 4.08 2.94 -1.68 0.33 2.68 0.14 3.32 1.02 0.60 
Long/Short Equity  135 0.41 6.12  10.50  -12.08  0.43 12.5 0.19  6.7 77.64  0.00 
Distressed 135 0.24 7.32 6.69 -13.1 0.79 3.58 -2.88  20.67  1942.12  0.00 
Event Driven MS  135 0.19 4.68 6.17  -12.17  0.45 4.15 -2.72  20.51  1891.51  0.00 
Risk Arb  135 0.12 2.16 4.26 -6.8 0.19 3.19 -1.4 9.95  315.67  0.00 
S&P 500  135 1.00 5.52  15.10  -15.09  0.97 9.25 -0.59 3.47 9.05 0.01 
40Figure 1: Unconditional and Conditional Distributions of the S&P 500 in 3
Regimes
The ﬁrst panel describes unconditional distribution of the S&P 500 as a mixture of the down-market, up-
market and normal regimes. The second panel describes the distribution of the S&P 500 conditional on
the down-market regime. There are 3 states of the market: regime 0 is an up-market regime, regime 1 is a


































































41Figure 2: Conditional Distributions of the S&P 500 in 3 Regimes
The ﬁrst panel describes the distribution of the S&P 500 conditional on the up-market regime. The second
panel describes the distribution of the S&P 500 conditional on the normal regime. There are 3 states of
the market: regime 0 is an up-market regime, regime 1 is a normal regime and regime 2 is a down-market
regime.















































































42Figure 3: Evolution of Market Betas
The ﬁgures present the evolution of market betas for Hedge fund index, Long/Short Equity and Emerging









































































































































43Table 2: Regime-Switching Model for the Market Risk Factor, S&P 500
This table presents the results for the regime-switching model for the market risk factor, S&P 500. The
following model is estimated: It=µ(St)+σ(St) t, where µi and σi are mean and standard deviation of regime
i, respectively. There are three regimes that are estimated: regime 0 (up-market), regime 1 (normal) and
regime 2 (down-market). The frequency of S&P 500 regimes from 1994 to 2005 is calculated. The 3X3
matrix of transition probabilities is estimated (Pij is the transition probability of moving from regime i to
regime j). Parameters that are signiﬁcant at the 10% level are shown in bold type.
Estimate    t-stat Estimate    t-stat Estimate    t-stat
5.79 15.22 0.85 2.53 -2.02 -2.25
Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat
1.52 12.80 2.49 25.74 4.51 29.46
Regime 0 Regime 1 Regime 2
Regime 0 0.28 0.05 0.67
Regime 1 0.02 0.98 0.00
Regime 2 0.26 0.00 0.74




Regime 0P Regime 1P Regime 2P
Standard Deviation (%)
Regime 0V Regime 1V Regime 2V
Frequency of S&P500 regimes from 1994-2005 (%)
44Table 3: One-Factor Model
This table presents the exposure of the CSFB/Tremont hedge-fund index strategies to diﬀerent S&P 500
regimes. The following model is estimated: Rt=α(Zt)+β(St)It+ω(Zt)ut.I t is the market factor, S&P 500.
St is the Markov Chain for the S&P 500. It is characterized by 3 states (regime 0: up-market, regime 1:
normal and regime 2: down-market). Each state of the market index I has its own mean and variance:
It=µ(St)+σ(St)  t. ut is IID, ω is volatility of the idiosyncratic risk factor, which is characterized by the
Markov Chain Zt. The Zt Markov Chain has two states (state 0: low volatility and state 1: high volatility
of idiosyncratic risk factor). pz
00 and pz
11 are transition probabilities of staying in state 0 (1) given state 0
(1) of the idiosyncratic risk factor. Parameters that are signiﬁcant at the 10% level are shown in bold type.
Variable/
Strategy
Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat
D 0.75 7.28 0.32 11.95 1.12 4.78 0.31 4.37
D -0.57 -2.79 -0.13 -0.48 -0.09 -0.16 0.16 1.10
E0 (SP) 0.02 0.84 -0.67 -43.38 0.16 1.56 0.11 3.42
E1 (SP) 0.06 1.48 -1.26 -61.16 0.41 2.80 0.07 1.62
E2 (SP) -0.02 -0.92 -0.78 -238.32 0.50 8.57 0.03 1.50
Z 0.51 9.17 0.04 5.77 1.63 10.50 0.58 19.90
Z 1.75 8.93 3.37 16.60 5.27 15.21 0.97 14.82
p
Z
00 0.88 0.37 0.98 0.99
p
Z
11 0.83 0.97 1.00 1.00
PseudoR
2 0.10 0.12 0.09 0.07
Variable/
Strategy
Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat
D -0.10 -0.88 0.68 6.73 0.52 6.27 0.21 2.58
D 1.09 2.29 -3.84 -81.92 -3.99 -1.43 -0.25 -0.64
E0 (SP) 0.18 2.30 0.09 1.76 0.14 2.35 0.09 2.48
E1 (SP) 0.64 12.71 0.37 9.26 0.14 2.71 0.14 3.39
E2 (SP) 0.23 4.49 0.13 3.22 0.17 3.99 0.06 1.67
Z 1.24 13.71 1.18 22.59 1.13 26.56 0.68 12.30
Z 3.88 8.74 3.78 2.73 3.44 2.32 1.85 4.63
p
Z
00 0.99 0.98 0.99 0.89
p
Z
11 0.97 0.51 0.77 0.66
PseudoR
2 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.08
Equity Market Neutral Convertible Bond Arb Dedicated Shortseller Emerging Markets
Long/Short Equity Distressed Event Driven Multi-
Strategy
Risk Arb
45Table 4: Variable Deﬁnitions
This table presents deﬁnitions of market and other risk factors used in multifactor models. All variables
except Change in VIX and Momentum Factor are obtained using Datastream. Change in VIX is obtained
from the CBOE. Momentum Factor is obtained from Ken French’s website.
Variable Abbreviation Definition
S&P500 SP Monthly return of the S&P 500 index including dividends
Large-Small LS Monthly return difference between Russell 1000 and Russell 2000 indexes
Value-Growth VG Monthly return difference between Russell 1000 Value and Growth indexes
USD USD Monthly return on Bank of England Trade Weighted Index
Lehman Government Credit L.GC Monthly return of the Lehman U.S. Aggregated Government/Credit index
Term Spread TS 10-year T Bond minus 6-month LIBOR
Change in VIX dVIX Monthly change in implied volatility based on the CBOE's OEX options.
Credit Spread CS The difference between BAA and AAA indexes provide by Moody's
Gold Gold Monthly return using gold bullion $/Troy Oz. Price
MSCI Emerging Bond MSCIEmD Monthly return of the MSCI Emerging Markets Bond Index
MSCI Emerging Stock MSCIEMS Monthly return of the MSCI Emerging Markets Stock Index
Momentum Factor UMD Momentum factor
46Table 5: Multifactor Model with Non-Linear Exposure Only to S&P 500
This table presents the exposure of the CSFB/Tremont hedge-fund index strategies to the S&P 500 (SP)
in diﬀerent S&P 500 regimes and other risk factors: Large-Small (LS), Value-Growth (VG), USD, Lehman
Government Credit (L.GC), Term Spread (TS), Change in VIX (dVIX), Credit Spread (CS), Gold, MSCI
Emerging Bond (MSCIEMD), MSCI Emerging Stock (MSCIEMS) and Momentum Factor (UMD). The
following model is estimated: Rt=α(Zt)+β(St)It+
 K
k=1 θkFkt+ω(Zt)ut.I t is the market factor, S&P 500
and Fkt are other risk factors. St is the Markov Chain for the S&P 500. It is characterized by 3 states
(regime 0: up-market, regime 1: normal and regime 2: down-market). Each state of the market index
I has its own mean and variance: It=µ(St)+σ(St)  t. ut is IID, ω is volatility of the idiosyncratic risk
factor, which is characterized by the Markov Chain Zt. The Zt Markov Chain has two states (state 0: low
volatility and state 1: high volatility of idiosyncratic risk factor). pz
00 and pz
11 are transition probabilities
of staying in state 0 (1) given state 0 (1) of the idiosyncratic risk factor. Hedge fund returns, S&P 500,
USD, Lehman Government Credit and Gold are used in excess of LIBOR returns. Panel A presents results
for the Convertible Bond Arbitrage, Dedicated Shortseller, Emerging Markets and Equity Market Neutral
strategies. Panel B presents results for the Long/Short Equity, Distressed, Event Driven Multi-Strategy and




Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat
D 0.79 11.39 0.11 0.69 0.45 2.79 0.27 2.32
D -0.38 -2.06 0.52 1.51 0.22 1.21
E0 (SP) 0.04 1.89 -0.87 -7.98 0.04 0.37 0.09 2.81
E1 (SP) 0.01 0.38 -1.09 -10.44 -0.14 -1.42 0.03 0.59
E2 (SP) 0.01 0.64 -0.77 -7.39 0.10 1.16 0.00 0.16
T1 (LS) -0.05 -4.11 0.47 7.35
T2  (VG) 0.05 4.66 0.24 5.33
T3 (USD) 0.33 3.62 0.26 2.78
T4 (L.GC) 0.13 4.16 0.49 3.06 0.08 1.95
T5 (TS) 0.64 3.62
T6 (dVIX)
T7 (CS) -1.79 -4.43 -0.73 -211.82
T8 (Gold)
T (MSCIEMD) 0.25 2.49
T (MSCIEMS) 0.44 8.42 0.03 2.08
T11 (UMD) 0.12 1.90
Z 0.34 8.52 2.47 22.09 1.07 5.03 0.56 15.13
Z 1.66 10.79 3.57 12.42 0.96 9.55
p
Z
00 0.85 0.98 0.99
p
Z
11 0.85 1.00 1.00
PseudoR
2 0.13 0.18 0.20 0.08




Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat
D -0.16 -1.86 0.73 5.73 0.58 6.87 0.05 0.72
D 0.63 1.24 -3.04 -1.64 0.48 2.48
E0 (SP) 0.59 10.10 0.08 1.52 0.19 4.72 0.09 2.79
E1 (SP) 0.51 11.24 0.30 4.89 0.11 2.05 0.15 3.11
E2 (SP) 0.48 11.51 0.39 3.20 0.16 3.52 0.17 4.58
T1 (LS) -0.35 -9.81 -0.18 -4.72 -0.11 -4.98 -0.14 -6.96
T2  (VG) 0.11 2.36 0.07 3.90
T3 (USD) 0.24 3.54
T4 (L.GC) 0.23 3.53 0.23 2.95
T5 (TS) -0.31 -2.71
T6 (dVIX) 0.12 3.49 0.09 4.35
T7 (CS) -2.25 -2.55 -2.69 -2.14 -1.24 -17.81
T8 (Gold)
T (MSCIEMD) -0.13 -1.75 0.12 1.72
T (MSCIEMS) 0.09 5.51
T11 (UMD) 0.17 8.18 0.04 3.26
Z 1.03 23.51 1.37 12.09 0.86 16.91 0.74 17.01
Z 2.57 6.21 2.99 4.15 1.29 5.78
p
Z
00 0.99 0.98 0.99
p
Z
11 0.94 0.64 0.96
PseudoR
2 0.25 0.11 0.20 0.13
Long/Short Equity Distressed Event Driven Multi-
Strategy
Risk Arb
48Table 6: Multifactor Model with Non-Linear Exposure to All Factors
This table presents the non-linear exposure of the CSFB/Tremont hedge-fund index strategies to the S&P 500
(SP), Large-Small (LS), Value-Growth (VG), USD, Lehman Government Credit (L.GC), Term Spread (TS),
Change in VIX (dVIX), Credit Spread (CS), Gold, MSCI Emerging Bond (MSCIEMD), MSCI Emerging
Stock (MSCIEMS) and Momentum Factor (UMD) for diﬀerent S&P 500 regimes. The following model
is estimated: Rt=α(Zt)+β(St)It+
 K
k=1 θk(St)Fkt+ω(Zt)ut.I t is the market factor, S&P 500 and Fkt are
other risk factors. Regime 0: up-market, regime 1: normal and regime 2: down-market. Parameters that




Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat
D 0.75 12.44 -0.23 -1.13 0.31 1.60 0.29 4.86
D -0.35 -1.74 0.66 2.12 0.16 1.46
E0 (SP) 0.05 2.18 -0.88 -8.54 0.01 0.04 0.10 2.30
E1 (SP) 0.05 0.85 -0.88 -8.85 -0.31 -2.79 0.06 1.08
E2 (SP) 0.01 0.73 -0.80 -5.97 0.17 2.28 -0.01 -0.56
T1_0 (LS) -0.03 -1.08 0.24 1.62
T1_1 (LS) 0.00 0.01 0.86 8.72
T1_2 (LS) -0.09 -4.78 0.45 4.90
T2_0  (VG) 0.07 2.26 -0.03 -0.23
T2_1  (VG) 0.04 0.61 0.70 4.11
T2_2  (VG) 0.06 5.49 0.23 2.71
T3_0 (USD) 0.54 1.64 0.69 2.45
T3_1 (USD) -0.19 -0.95 -0.06 -0.42
T3_2 (USD) 0.21 1.57 0.37 5.72
T4_0 (L.GC) 0.17 2.74 1.57 4.96 0.19 1.47
T4_1 (L.GC) 0.03 0.26 0.12 0.56 0.11 1.34
T4_2 (L.GC) 0.14 2.70 0.48 1.75 0.02 0.31
T5_0 (TS) 2.01 7.91
T5_1 (TS) 0.59 1.94




T7_0 (CS) -2.01 -112.86 1.75 5.09
T7_1 (CS) 1.12 73.38 -5.98 -18.30




T9_0 (MSCIEMD) -0.44 -1.78
T9_1 (MSCIEMD) -0.09 -0.72
T9_2 (MSCIEMD) 0.12 0.96
T10_0 (MSCIEMS) 0.66 4.41 0.03 0.83
T10_1 (MSCIEMS) 0.58 4.76 0.01 0.16
T10_2 (MSCIEMS) 0.38 7.18 0.04 2.46
T11_0 (UMD) 0.17 2.25
T11_1 (UMD) -0.08 -1.31
T11_2 (UMD) 0.16 4.34
Z 0.31 6.20 2.31 14.91 0.96 5.35 0.57 21.38
Z 1.70 9.37 3.41 12.04 0.97 14.17
p
Z
00 0.85 0.98 0.99
p
Z
11 0.85 1.00 1.00
PseudoR
2 0.18 0.23 0.23 0.10




Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat
D -0.15 -2.59 0.69 14.35 0.50 6.44 -0.03 -0.16
D 0.68 16.13 -2.95 -10.35 0.21 1.92
E0 (SP) 0.73 8.96 0.12 2.12 0.28 5.21 0.14 3.24
E1 (SP) 0.58 13.04 0.26 4.27 0.08 1.40 0.12 1.33
E2 (SP) 0.38 9.67 0.39 3.26 0.11 2.04 0.21 3.41
T1_0 (LS) -0.61 -7.62 -0.21 -5.86 -0.13 -3.77 -0.12 -1.59
T1_1 (LS) -0.40 -5.63 -0.13 -2.73 0.01 0.20 -0.10 -1.91
T1_2 (LS) -0.27 -5.60 -0.18 -2.34 -0.12 -3.92 -0.20 -3.83
T2_0  (VG) 0.14 1.81 0.18 3.01
T2_1  (VG) 0.01 0.19 -0.13 -1.17
T2_2  (VG) 0.12 1.61 0.11 2.23
T3_0 (USD) 0.11 1.71
T3_1 (USD) 0.22 3.25
T3_2 (USD) 0.05 0.66
T4_0 (L.GC) 0.12 2.32 0.52 4.29
T4_1 (L.GC) 0.11 1.11 0.13 2.43
T4_2 (L.GC) 0.35 3.61 0.23 1.83
T5_0 (TS) -0.62 -1.72
T5_1 (TS) -0.48 -2.94
T5_2 (TS) 0.01 0.05
T6_0 (dVIX) 0.28 4.28 0.25 7.76
T6_1 (dVIX) 0.13 2.61 0.07 1.31
T6_2 (dVIX) -0.02 -0.51 0.03 0.73
T7_0 (CS) 3.52 167.44 -5.35 -262.94 -0.34 -15.77
T7_1 (CS) -0.86 -80.03 -6.42 -1727.59 -3.50 -69.20




T9_0 (MSCIEMD) -0.46 -4.54
T9_1 (MSCIEMD) 0.07 0.86
T9_2 (MSCIEMD) -0.13 -1.77
T10_0 (MSCIEMS) 0.08 1.93
T10_1 (MSCIEMS) 0.09 2.83
T10_2 (MSCIEMS) 0.08 3.07
T11_0 (UMD) 0.24 4.75 0.04 1.84
T11_1 (UMD) -0.07 -1.41 0.05 1.15
T11_2 (UMD) 0.16 4.78 0.02 1.35
Z 0.91 25.44 1.36 7.93 0.79 18.65 0.42 6.58
Z 2.45 7.72 2.74 4.85 0.96 16.00
p
Z
00 0.99 0.98 0.95
p
Z
11 0.94 0.66 1.00
PseudoR
2 0.31 0.15 0.25 0.17
Long/Short Equity Distressed Event Driven Multi-
Strategy
Risk Arb
50Table 7: Multifactor Model with Omitted Factors
This table adds omitted factors to the results in Table 6, where the non-linear exposure of the CSFB/Tremont
hedge-fund index strategies to S&P 500 (SP), Large-Small (LS), Value-Growth (VG), USD, Lehman Govern-
ment Credit (L.GC), Term Spread (TS), Change in VIX (dVIX), Credit Spread (CS), Gold, MSCI Emerging
Bond (MSCIEMD), MSCI Emerging Stock (MSCIEMS) and Momentum Factor (UMD) for diﬀerent S&P
500 regimes is analyzed. The following model is estimated: Rt=α(Zt)+β(St)It+
 K
k=1 θk(St)Fkt+ω(Zt)ut.
It is the market factor, S&P 500 and Fkt are other risk factors. Regime 0: up-market, regime 1: normal and




Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat
D 0.77 11.25 -0.16 -0.75 0.09 0.83 0.32 6.06
D -0.38 -2.05 0.54 1.72 -0.07 -0.36
E0 (SP) 0.07 2.21 -1.02 -8.01 0.34 1.58 0.14 2.25
E1 (SP) 0.05 0.87 -1.01 -9.47 -0.28 -4.65 0.07 1.64
E2 (SP) -0.03 -1.12 -0.57 -4.83 -0.02 -0.19 -0.01 -0.49
T1_0 (LS) -0.02 -0.94 0.27 1.75 0.14 0.88 0.04 0.66
T1_1 (LS) 0.01 0.32 0.99 9.78 -0.08 -2.02 -0.02 -0.69
T1_2 (LS) -0.08 -4.65 0.37 5.05 -0.17 -2.47 0.01 0.33
T2_0  (VG) 0.07 2.18 -0.25 -2.07
T2_1  (VG) 0.06 0.89 0.73 4.08
T2_2  (VG) 0.07 4.49 0.27 4.04
T3_0 (USD) 1.42 2.44 0.89 2.90
T3_1 (USD) -0.36 -1.42 0.03 0.46
T3_2 (USD) 0.12 0.29 -0.01 -0.03
T4_0 (L.GC) 0.14 1.71
T4_1 (L.GC) 0.00 -0.05
T4_2 (L.GC) 0.13 2.81
T5_0 (TS) -0.29 -1.29
T5_1 (TS) 0.22 1.68
T5_2 (TS) 0.18 1.52
T6_0 (dVIX) 0.05 1.79 -0.42 -2.69 0.58 3.82 0.08 1.40
T6_1 (dVIX) -0.04 -1.20 -0.27 -2.22 0.17 2.52 0.09 2.39
T6_2 (dVIX) -0.08 -2.98 0.27 2.15 -0.03 -0.20 -0.06 -1.69
T7_0 (CS) -2.02 -12.07 -1.97 -0.26 -7.56 -0.81 -0.41 -0.18
T7_1 (CS) 0.40 4.59 -4.96 -8.54 -1.99 -1.25 -1.85 -1.34




T9_0 (MSCIEMD) 1.10 1.75
T9_1 (MSCIEMD) -0.42 -1.53
T9_2 (MSCIEMD) 0.19 0.55
T10_0 (MSCIEMS) 0.55 3.16
T10_1 (MSCIEMS) 0.50 14.08




Z 0.31 5.72 2.22 21.14 0.70 11.84 0.54 14.01
Z 1.61 10.80 3.01 16.47 1.15 7.72
p
Z
00 0.85 0.99 0.98
p
Z
11 0.86 0.99 0.96
PseudoR
2 0.19 0.24 0.28 0.14




Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat
D -0.15 -2.59 0.63 6.20 0.50 6.44 -0.18 -2.10
D 0.68 16.13 -2.95 -10.35 0.26 2.08
E0 (SP) 0.73 8.96 0.18 2.73 0.28 5.21 0.14 2.55
E1 (SP) 0.58 13.04 0.36 9.94 0.08 1.40 0.16 3.75
E2 (SP) 0.38 9.67 0.22 3.60 0.11 2.04 0.08 2.03
T1_0 (LS) -0.61 -7.62 -0.23 -5.13 -0.13 -3.77 -0.15 -2.43
T1_1 (LS) -0.40 -5.63 -0.19 -3.91 0.01 0.20 -0.12 -4.67
T1_2 (LS) -0.27 -5.60 -0.13 -1.81 -0.12 -3.92 -0.17 -7.05
T2_0  (VG) 0.17 4.71 0.16 3.16
T2_1  (VG) 0.05 1.95 0.05 0.81
T2_2  (VG) 0.09 1.37 0.07 2.56
T3_0 (USD) 0.11 1.71
T3_1 (USD) 0.22 3.25
T3_2 (USD) 0.05 0.66
T4_0 (L.GC) 0.12 2.32 0.48 3.12
T4_1 (L.GC) 0.11 1.11 0.22 2.44
T4_2 (L.GC) 0.35 3.61 0.23 2.13
T5_0 (TS) -0.62 -1.72
T5_1 (TS) -0.48 -2.94
T5_2 (TS) 0.01 0.05
T6_0 (dVIX) 0.28 4.28 0.04 0.73 0.25 7.76 0.01 0.14
T6_1 (dVIX) 0.13 2.61 0.24 4.93 0.07 1.31 0.09 1.90
T6_2 (dVIX) -0.02 -0.51 -0.22 -1.97 0.03 0.73 -0.12 -1.92
T7_0 (CS) 3.52 167.44 -5.22 -1975.22 -0.34 -15.77 4.45 1.73
T7_1 (CS) -0.86 -80.03 -5.71 -2457.87 -3.50 -69.20 -0.85 -0.85




T9_0 (MSCIEMD) -0.48 -7.10
T9_1 (MSCIEMD) -0.07 -1.11
T9_2 (MSCIEMD) -0.09 -0.92
T10_0 (MSCIEMS) 0.08 1.93
T10_1 (MSCIEMS) 0.09 2.83
T10_2 (MSCIEMS) 0.08 3.07
T11_0 (UMD) 0.24 4.75 0.04 1.84
T11_1 (UMD) -0.07 -1.41 0.05 1.15
T11_2 (UMD) 0.16 4.78 0.02 1.35
Z 0.91 25.44 0.07 10.74 0.79 18.65 0.50 11.65
Z 2.45 7.72 2.74 4.85 0.98 12.62
p
Z
00 0.99 0.98 0.99
p
Z
11 0.94 0.66 0.99
PseudoR
2 0.31 0.16 0.25 0.18
Long/Short Equity Distressed Event Driven Multi-
Strategy
Risk Arb
52Figure 4: Probability of Being in a High-Volatility State of the Idiosyncratic Risk
Factor for CA, EM, and EM Strategies
These ﬁgures depict the probability of being in a high-volatility state of the idiosyncratic risk factor for





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































53Figure 5: Probability of Being in a High-Volatility State of the Idiosyncratic Risk
Factor for LS, ED and RA Strategies
These ﬁgures depict the probability of being in a high-volatility state of the idiosyncratic risk factor for















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































54Figure 6: The Joint Probability of High-Volatility State of the Idiosyncratic Risk
Factor for All Hedge Fund Strategies
Panel A presents the joint ﬁltered probability of high-volatility state of the idiosyncratic risk factor for all
CSFB/Tremont hedge-fund index strategies from January 1994 to March 2005. Panel B concentrates on the
joint ﬁltered probability of high-volatility state of the idiosyncratic risk factor in 1998, around the time of
the Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) crisis.
Panel A
Panel B
















































































































































































































































55Table 8: Multifactor OLS Model
This table presents the results for the OLS regression of the CSFB/Tremont hedge-fund index strategies
on S&P 500 (SP), Large-Small (LS), Value-Growth (VG), USD, Lehman Government Credit (L.GC), Term
Spread (TS), Change in VIX (dVIX), Credit Spread (CS), Gold, MSCI Emerging Bond (MSCIEMD), MSCI
Emerging Stock (MSCIEMS) and Momentum Factor (UMD). Hedge fund returns, S&P 500, USD, Lehman
Government Credit and Gold are used in excess of LIBOR returns. Parameters that are signiﬁcant at the
10% level are shown in bold type.
Variable/
Strategy
Estimate    t-stat Estimate    t-stat Estimate    t-stat Estimate    t-stat
D 0.33 3.39 -0.24 -1.25 0.23 1.45 0.31 4.99
E (SP) 0.05 1.43 -0.87 -12.74 0.09 1.33 0.07 4.72
E (LS) -0.08 -1.95 0.47 5.61
E  (VG) 0.23 4.36
E (USD) 0.17 2.35
E (L.GC) 0.20 2.70 0.68 3.82
E (TS) 0.91 3.88
E (dVIX) 0.20 2.94
E (CS) -0.95 -428.94 -3.90 -299.92
E (Gold) -0.11 -2.23
E (MSCIEMD) -0.62 -5.49
E(MSCIEMS) 0.62 14.79
E (UMD) 0.19 7.55
Z 1.27 11.31 2.48 16.48 2.54 19.96 0.78 16.48
Adj. R
2 0.04 0.75 0.51 0.14
Pseudo R
2 0.02 0.18 0.10 0.04
Variable/
Strategy
Estimate    t-stat Estimate    t-stat Estimate    t-stat Estimate    t-stat
D 0.01 0.12 0.46 3.56 0.36 3.26 0.09 1.02
E (SP) 0.57 12.34 0.29 4.14 0.16 3.19 0.17 5.03
E (LS) -0.39 -10.07 -0.19 -4.22 -0.13 -3.86 -0.16 -5.83
E  (VG) 0.11 2.27 0.09 2.17 0.08 3.02
E (USD) 0.19 2.43
E (L.GC) 0.14 1.70 0.24 4.36
E (TS) -0.23 -1.85
E (dVIX) 0.09 1.81
E (CS) -4.20 -2.91 -3.37 -2.61 -3.23 -1513.27
E (Gold)
E (MSCIEMD) -0.15 -2.22
E(MSCIEMS) 0.10 2.87
E (UMD) 0.23 7.83 0.06 2.53
Z 1.36 19.94 1.42 10.38 1.27 8.47 0.93 13.91
Adj. R
2 0.79 0.43 0.46 0.41
Pseudo R
2 0.23 0.10 0.11 0.11
Long/Short Equity Distressed Event Driven Multi-
Strategy
Risk Arb
Convertible Bond Arb Dedicated Shortseller Emerging Markets Equity Market Neutral
56Table 9: Asymmetric Beta and Threshold Models
This table presents the results for regressions of monthly CSFB/Tremont hedge-fund index returns on three











t +  it, where I
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t = µ + σ,I0
t = µ − σ<I t <µ+ σ,I
−
t = µ + σ. It is the return on the
market index, S&P 500. I
+
t , I0
t , and I
−
t represent the returns of the S&P 500 that are, respectively, larger
than the mean plus one standard deviation, between the mean plus and minus one standard deviation, and
below the mean minus one standard deviation. µ is the mean and σ is the standard deviation of the S&P
500. Parameters that are signiﬁcant at the 10% level are shown in bold type.
Variable/
Strategy
Estimate     t-stat Estimate     t-stat Estimate     t-stat Estimate     t-stat
D 0.31 2.40 -0.29 -0.81 0.45 1.15 0.25 3.37
E 0.03 0.39 -0.81 -8.84 0.34 3.03 0.13 4.45
E 0.00 -0.02 -0.87 -5.78 0.47 2.50 0.02 0.60
E 0.06 0.81 -0.97 -6.94 0.73 3.73 0.05 2.15
Adj.R
2 0.00 0.58 0.23 0.17
PseudoR
2 0.00 0.11 0.04 0.05
Variable/
Strategy
Estimate     t-stat Estimate     t-stat Estimate     t-stat Estimate     t-stat
D 0.36 1.65 0.84 5.71 0.55 3.79 0.24 2.08
E 0.35 3.06 0.07 1.46 0.08 1.45 0.06 1.62
E 0.49 4.72 0.22 4.33 0.15 2.63 0.13 2.29
E 0.42 4.69 0.38 2.82 0.30 2.18 0.17 2.21
Adj.R
2 0.33 0.35 0.25 0.22
PseudoR
2 0.06 0.08 0.05 0.05
Equity Market Neutral Convertible Bond Arb Dedicated Shortseller Emerging Markets
Long/Short Equity Distressed Event Driven Multi-
Strategy
Risk Arb
57Table 10: Multifactor Model: Observed vs. Real Hedge Fund Returns
This table presents the comparison of non-linear exposure of the CSFB/Tremont hedge-fund index strategies
to S&P 500 (SP), Large-Small (LS), Value-Growth (VG), USD, Lehman Government Credit (L.GC), Term
Spread (TS), Change in VIX (dVIX), Credit Spread (CS), Gold, MSCI Emerging Bond (MSCIEMD), MSCI
Emerging Stock (MSCIEMS) and Momentum Factor (UMD) for diﬀerent S&P 500 regimes for “observed”
(provided by the data) versus “real” hedge fund index returns. “Real” returns are obtained by using MA(2)




Observed Real Observed Real Observed Real Observed Real
D 0.75 0.27 -0.23 0.24 0.31 0.05 0.29 0.01
D -0.35 -0.07 0.66 0.16 -0.05
E0 (SP) 0.05 0.07 -0.88 -0.82 0.01 0.29 0.10 0.10
E1 (SP) 0.05 0.02 -0.88 -0.93 -0.31 0.05 0.06 0.06
E2 (SP) 0.01 0.02 -0.80 -0.79 0.17 -0.21 -0.01 0.00
T1_0 (LS) -0.03 -0.07 0.24 0.22 0.22
T1_1 (LS) 0.00 0.07 0.86 0.89
T1_2 (LS) -0.09 -0.12 0.45 0.43
T2_0  (VG) 0.07 0.10 -0.03 -0.03
T2_1  (VG) 0.04 -0.01 0.70 0.74
T2_2  (VG) 0.06 0.06 0.23 0.24
T3_0 (USD) 0.54 0.41 0.69 0.48
T3_1 (USD) -0.19 -0.18 -0.06 0.10
T3_2 (USD) 0.21 0.14 0.37 0.38
T4_0 (L.GC) 0.17 0.13 1.57 1.00 0.19 0.21
T4_1 (L.GC) 0.03 -0.03 0.12 0.27 0.11 0.09
T4_2 (L.GC) 0.14 0.11 0.48 0.71 0.02 0.05
T5_0 (TS) 2.01 0.70
T5_1 (TS) 0.59 0.46




T7_0 (CS) -2.01 -0.42 1.75 0.57
T7_1 (CS) 1.12 -3.07 -5.98 -7.06




T9_0 (MSCIEMD) -0.44 -0.08
T9_1 (MSCIEMD) -0.09 -0.35
T9_2 (MSCIEMD) 0.12 0.18
T10_0 (MSCIEMS) 0.66 0.61 0.03 0.03
T10_1 (MSCIEMS) 0.58 0.50 0.01 0.00
T10_2 (MSCIEMS) 0.38 0.36 0.04 0.04
T11_0 (UMD) 0.17 0.16
T11_1 (UMD) -0.08 -0.02
T11_2 (UMD) 0.16 0.18
Z 0.31 0.26 2.31 2.26 0.96 1.14 0.57 0.53
Z 1.70 1.33 3.41 2.95 0.97 0.92
p
Z
00 0.85 0.80 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.99
p
Z
11 0.85 0.86 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
PseudoR
2 0.14 0.17 0.20 0.19 0.17 0.16 0.09 0.11




  Observed   Real  Observed   Real  Observed   Real   Observed   Real
D -0.15 -0.51 0.69 0.30 0.50 0.20 -0.03 -0.05
D 0.68 0.11 -2.95 -0.68 0.21 0.07
E0 (SP) 0.73 0.70 0.12 0.10 0.28 0.26 0.14 0.14
E1 (SP) 0.58 0.54 0.26 0.22 0.08 0.11 0.12 0.15
E2 (SP) 0.38 0.36 0.39 0.40 0.11 0.09 0.21 0.17
T1_0 (LS) -0.61 -0.63 -0.21 -0.19 -0.13 -0.18 -0.12 -0.13
T1_1 (LS) -0.40 -0.36 -0.13 -0.12 0.01 -0.03 -0.10 -0.10
T1_2 (LS) -0.27 -0.26 -0.18 -0.16 -0.12 -0.10 -0.20 -0.15
T2_0  (VG) 0.14 0.05 0.18 0.14
T2_1  (VG) 0.01 0.01 -0.13 -0.14
T2_2  (VG) 0.12 0.10 0.11 0.08
T3_0 (USD) 0.11 0.20
T3_1 (USD) 0.22 0.05
T3_2 (USD) 0.05 0.06
T4_0 (L.GC) 0.12 0.15 0.52 0.62
T4_1 (L.GC) 0.11 0.10 0.13 0.10
T4_2 (L.GC) 0.35 0.44 0.23 0.34
T5_0 (TS) -0.62 -0.67
T5_1 (TS) -0.48 -0.43
T5_2 (TS) 0.01 0.21
T6_0 (dVIX) 0.28 0.19 0.25 0.17
T6_1 (dVIX) 0.13 0.07 0.07 -0.02
T6_2 (dVIX) -0.02 -0.07 0.03 0.02
T7_0 (CS) 3.52 1.50 -5.35 -3.20 -0.34 1.15
T7_1 (CS) -0.86 -1.55 -6.42 -2.94 -3.50 -1.00




T9_0 (MSCIEMD) -0.46 -0.17
T9_1 (MSCIEMD) 0.07 0.07
T9_2 (MSCIEMD) -0.13 -0.14
T10_0 (MSCIEMS) 0.08 0.06
T10_1 (MSCIEMS) 0.09 0.08
T10_2 (MSCIEMS) 0.08 0.10
T11_0 (UMD) 0.24 0.27 0.04 0.02
T11_1 (UMD) -0.07 -0.06 0.05 0.00
T11_2 (UMD) 0.16 0.17 0.02 0.03
Z 0.91 0.86 1.36 1.24 0.79 0.75 0.42 0.40
Z 2.45 2.08 2.74 2.23 0.96 1.14
p
Z
00 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.95 0.74
p
Z
11 0.94 0.94 0.66 0.84 1.00 0.79
PseudoR
2 0.28 0.27 0.12 0.15 0.21 0.21 0.17 0.16
Long/Short Equity Distressed Event Driven Multi-
Strategy
Risk Arb
59Table 11: Normality Test
This table presents Jarque-Bera statistics and corresponding p-values for Original Data, OLS, Multifactor
Model with Non-Linear Exposure Only to S&P 500, and Multifactor Model with Non-Linear Exposure to All
Factors for all CSFB/Tremont hedge-fund index strategies. Multifactor Model with Non-Linear Exposure
Only to S&P 500: Rt=α(Zt)+β(St)It+
 K
k=1 θkFkt+ω(Zt)ut. Multifactor Model with Non-Linear Exposure
to All Factors: Rt=α(Zt)+β(St)It+
 K
k=1 θk(St)Fkt+ω(Zt)ut.I t is the market factor, S&P 500 and Fkt are
other risk factors. St is the Markov Chain for the S&P 500. It is characterized by 3 states (regime 0:
up-market, regime 1: normal and regime 2: down-market). Each state of the market index I has its own
mean and variance: It=µ(St)+σ(St)  t. ut is IID, ω is volatility of the idiosyncratic risk factor, which is
characterized by the Markov Chain Zt. The Zt Markov Chain has two states (state 0: low volatility and state
1: high volatility of idiosyncratic risk factor). Jarque-Bera test statistics that lead to rejection of normality
of residuals are shown in bold. Parameters that are signiﬁcant at the 5% level are shown in bold type.
Strategy/Model
JB statistic p-value JB statistic p-value JB statistic p-value JB statistic p-value
Convertible Bond Arb. 119.97 0.00 63.28 0.00 46.37 0.00 43.50 0.00
Dedicated Shortseller 34.58 0.00 2.96 0.23 3.56 0.17 5.68 0.06
Emerging Markets 105.21 0.00 4.53 0.10 0.37 0.83 1.05 0.59
Equity Market Neutral 1.02 0.60 0.24 0.89 0.89 0.64 1.34 0.51
Long/Short Equity 77.64 0.00 0.16 0.92 2.11 0.35 2.40 0.30
Distressed 1942.12 0.00 330.90 0.00 126.04 0.00 133.80 0.00
Event Driven M.S. 1891.51 0.00 355.15 0.00 4.59 0.10 4.20 0.12
Risk Arbitrage 315.67 0.00 12.52 0.00 9.31 0.01 4.61 0.10
Table 6 Original Data OLS Table 5
60Figure 7: Out-of-Sample Dynamics: Emerging Markets Strategy
This ﬁgure presents out-of-sample dynamics for the Emerging Markets strategy. The ﬁrst panel shows the
VaR calculated using the Multifactor Regime-Switching Beta Model (MRSB) versus actual observations of
the strategy. The second panel shows the VaR calculated using OLS Model versus actual observations. Both
return and VaR estimates are in percentages. Three conﬁdence levels are considered: 95%, 99%, and 99.5%.
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61Table 12: Out-of-Sample Tests
Panel A presents results for mimicking performance. Results for Mean Absolute Error (MAE) tests for OLS,
Random Walk (RW), Multifactor Regime-Switching Beta (MRSB) and Multifactor Regime-Switching Beta
Adjusted for Autocorrelation MRSB AR models are presented. Panel B presents results for negative tail
risk exposure for each hedge fund strategy. For each month in the 24 months of out-of-sample data, VaR
estimates are calculated. This panel presents the average of these VaR estimates. These estimates are in
percentages. Three conﬁdence levels are considered: 95%, 99%, and 99.5%. VaR levels are calculated for
Multifactor Regime-Switching Beta (MRSB) and OLS models.
Panel A
Strategy/Test
OLS RW MRSB MRSB_AR
Conv. Bond Arb. 0.94 0.91 0.86 0.80
Dedicated Shortseller 1.86 3.38 1.85 1.85
Emerging Markets 1.82 2.47 0.70 1.01
Equity Mkt Neutral 0.53 0.54 0.49 0.47
Long/Short Equity 0.86 2.06 0.89 0.89
Distressed 0.58 0.94 0.47 0.63
Event Driven MS 2.18 1.66 1.03 0.83




99.50% 99% 95% 99.50% 99% 95%
Conv. Bond Arb. -3.00 -2.68 -1.82 -3.49 -2.94 -1.16
Dedicated Shortseller -7.25 -6.63 -4.93 -6.29 -5.72 -4.16
Emerging Markets -2.96 -2.61 -1.64 -2.54 -2.21 -1.31
Equity Mkt Neutral -6.24 -5.60 -3.87 -1.41 -1.01 -0.30
Long/Short Equity -1.64 -1.44 -0.92 -1.29 -1.13 -0.71
Distressed -2.27 -1.95 -1.08 -7.69 -7.01 -5.16
Event Driven MS -2.96 -2.62 -1.70 -2.11 -1.80 -1.10
Risk Arb -2.14 -1.90 -1.27 -1.13 -0.99 -0.66
OLS MSRB
629 Appendix
9.1 Category Analysis for Multifactor Model with Non-Linear Ex-
posure Only to the S&P 500
Convertible Bond Arbitrage
This strategy is characterized by investing in a company bond while shorting the com-
mon stock of the same company. Positions are designed to protect the principal from market
moves. As was shown before in a one-factor setting, the convertible bond arbitrage strategy
is not correlated with S&P 500 moves in all regimes (Table 3). However, in the multifactor
setting, we ﬁnd a slight positive exposure of 0.04 to the S&P 500 in the up-market. There
are two potential explanations for this eﬀect. First, as the market moves up, hedge fund
managers do not have adequate time to hedge the stock exposure by shorting more stock.
Second, the arbitrageurs would like to capitalize on the up-market move, and will not hedge
perfectly in order to make more money. The strategy does better when returns on small
and value stocks are high. Clearly, because the strategy is designed to proﬁt from upward
ﬁxed income moves, the strategy is positively related to the Lehman Government Credit
bond index returns. The most signiﬁcant coeﬃcient in the regression is -1.79 eﬀect of Credit
Spread. Clearly, when credit spread increases, liquidity decreases and there is a low demand
for low-credit securities. Convertible Bond Arbitrage funds primarily hold low-credit securi-
ties. At the time of high credit spreads, brokers request a higher hair-cut fee to obtain more
leverage. Cost of funding goes up; therefore, the return on the strategy decreases.
Dedicated Shortseller
This strategy is geared to maintain net short position at all times. The highest net
negative market exposure is during the normal regime of the market (-1.09). Dedicated
Shortseller strategy does well when large and value indexes are performing well. The strategy
also has a positive exposure to the US Dollar and MSCI Emerging Bond returns. Similar
to the Convertible Bond Arbitrage strategy, this strategy has a negative exposure (-0.73) to
the Credit Spread. However, the exposure is about twice as small: -0.73 compared to -1.77.
It makes sense that as credit spread increases, the cost of shorting a stock increases, thus,
decreasing the returns of the strategy.
Emerging Markets
This strategy involves both equity and ﬁxed income investing around the world. The net
market exposure is insigniﬁcant in all states of the market. The eﬀect of the US Dollar is
positive and signiﬁcant (0.27). A stronger US Dollar increases demand for foreign goods,
63thus boosting emerging markets economy. Since many emerging markets funds invest in
ﬁxed income, it makes sense that the relationship between the Lehman Government Credit
index returns and the strategy returns is positive and signiﬁcant (0.49). The strategy does
well when the yield curve is sloping up (the exposure to Term-Spread is 0.64). The Emerging
Markets strategy has a big and signiﬁcant (estimate is 1.07 and t-stat is 5.03) exposure to
the MSCI Emerging Stock, which makes sense as this strategy trades directly in this market.
Finally, there is a slight positive exposure to the Momentum Factor.
Equity Market Neutral
The strategy is designed to be market beta neutral, which is conﬁrmed for normal market
conditions (0.03 and not signiﬁcant). However, the strategy is not neutral during up-market
times. Managers are not able to timely put market hedges in place, thus, the strategy is
slightly positively exposed to upward market movements (0.09). The strategy seems to be
marginally exposed to Lehman Government Credit index and MSCIEMS.
Long/Short Equity
The strategy takes both long and short market positions. During the normal times of the
market factor, the exposure is 0.51 and remains almost the same in both down-market and
up-market periods. The strategy does well when small stocks do well. The strategy does
well during the low interest rate environment (the exposure to the Lehman Government
Credit index returns is positive = 0.23). Generally, the strategy is doing well when the yield
curve is ﬂat. So, if long or short-term rates are changing, then the return of the Long/Short
Equity strategy decreases as can be seen by a negative coeﬃcient on the term spread (-
0.31). The exposure to the Credit Spread is -2.25 and very signiﬁcant, which is consistent
with the general preference for small illiquid stocks and increase in stock lending rate in
increased credit spread environments. The strategy also beneﬁts from increase in volatility
and momentum factor.
Distressed
The Distressed strategy primarily concentrates on investing in the debt, equity or trade
claims of companies in ﬁnancial distress and generally bankruptcy. There is a modest market
exposure during normal times (0.30) and the exposure increases during down-market times.
The strategy does well when small stocks are outperforming their large counterparts and
when value stocks perform better than growth stocks. Because the strategy is also investing
in ﬁxed income, it is highly positively correlated with the Lehman Government Credit index
returns (0.23). Similar to Convertible Bond Arbitrage, the strategy suﬀers from an increase
in credit spreads, as the strategy primarily invests in Distressed, or low-quality and highly
64illiquid securities. These distressed securities will greatly suﬀer in liquidity crises. Therefore,
compared to all other strategies, the coeﬃcient (-2.69) on Credit Spread for the Distressed
strategy is the largest. There is also a slight negative exposure to the MSCI Emerging Bond
index.
Event Driven Multi-Strategy
This subset refers to hedge funds that draw upon multiple themes, including risk arbi-
trage, distressed securities, and occasionally others such as investments in micro and small
capitalization public companies that are raising money in private capital markets. Fund
managers often shift assets between strategies in response to market opportunities. There-
fore, the market exposure is positive in all market states. The strategy does well when small
stocks are outperforming large ones. Event Driven Multi-Strategy managers are opportunis-
tic and therefore when US Dollar is stronger, they have more investing power and can take
advantage of more investment opportunities. Therefore, the relationship between the US
Dollar and strategy returns is 0.24. There is a positive, but small exposure to change in
VIX (0.09). The most signiﬁcant coeﬃcient in the regression is -1.24 eﬀect of Credit Spread.
Clearly, when credit spread increases, liquidity decreases and there is a low demand for low-
credit securities. Event Driven Multi-Strategy funds mostly hold low-credit securities. At
the time of high credit spreads, brokers request a higher hair-cut fee to obtain more lever-
age. Cost of funding goes up, therefore, the return on the strategy decreases. The strategy
also has a positive exposure to MSCI Emerging Bond and Stock indexes as well as to the
Momentum Factor.
Risk Arbitrage
Risk (or sometimes called Merger) arbitrageurs are typically long the stock of the com-
pany being acquired and short the stock of the acquiring company. Market exposure is
positive especially in crises periods (0.17), indicating that managers in this strategy take
a lot of risk. The strategy is correlated with the performance of small versus large stocks
(-0.14). There is a small premium to value stocks (0.07).
9.2 Category Analysis for Multifactor Model with Non-Linear Ex-
posure to All Factors
Convertible Bond Arbitrage
Compared to previous results, the Convertible Bond Arbitrage strategy has a signiﬁcant
positive exposure to the S&P 500 during up-market times. During normal times and down-
market, there is no exposure because managers typically perfectly hedge market ﬂuctuations.
65Therefore, during market up-turns, the strategy is positively related to the market. The
strategy has a positive exposure to credit spread when the market is in the normal regime
(1.12). The spread reﬂects investor perception relating to how likely it is that the issuing
company will be able to make timely interest payments and pay oﬀ the principal at maturity.
The larger, or wider, the spread, the more concern investors have regarding the issuing
company’s ability to make timely interest payments. During normal times of the market,
investors are less worried about the increase in credit spread. However, during crises times,
this worry is more sound and the strategy is negatively compensated for having a high credit
spread (-2.72). During up-market times, the coeﬃcient on the credit spread is -2.01. We
observe this negative sign because convertible bond funds tend to short stock.
Dedicated Shortseller
Unlike other strategies, this strategy has a positive (0.45) exposure to LS during down-
markets. Moreover, it has insigniﬁcant exposure to CS in down-markets, negative exposure
during normal markets (-5.98) and positive during up-markets (1.75).
Emerging Markets
This strategy involves both equity and ﬁxed income investing around the world. The
net market exposure is positive for the down-state of the market, negative for the normal
state and zero in the up-state. Due to inability to short sell or the lack of put or other
hedging instruments, the exposure to the market is highly signiﬁcant in the down-state as
expected. Therefore, the exposure result is similar to writing a put option on the S&P
index. Interestingly, the exposure to the MSCI Emerging Stock is greatly reduced in the
down-market periods. The exposure to the Lehman Government Credit is negligible during
normal periods but positive during up and down-markets.
Equity Market Neutral
In the previous analysis on multifactor model with linear factors, Equity Market Neutral
index appears to be linked only to the Lehman Government Credit and MSCI Emerging stock
risk factors. Allowing for non-linearities, we ﬁnd that the exposure to the MSCI Emerging
stock risk factor is positive in the down-market and not signiﬁcant for other regimes. The
exposure to the S&P 500 is positive and signiﬁcant for the up-market and not signiﬁcant for
the normal and down-markets.
Long/Short Equity
The exposure to credit spread in a down-market period is (-3.30) and in a normal period
is (-0.86), whereas in an up-market period it is (3.52). It can be interpreted that generally
66Long/Short Equity managers tend to buy low liquidity, low credit rated instruments; how-
ever, in the up-market, they quickly adjust their exposure to buying high credit securities.
This might make sense because managers tend to take concentrated trades in speciﬁc sectors
or markets. The change in VIX is positively related to the strategy return in up and normal
states of the S&P 500.
Distressed
The exposure to credit spread is negative and signiﬁcant during all regimes of the credit
spread, meaning that distressed funds always hold illiquid and low quality securities. This
strategy is usually categorized by taking positions in companies that will do better in the
future through restructuring and other means. Therefore, an increase in credit spread sends
a signal that these companies might have an inability to make timely interest payments.
Therefore, the relationship between credit spread and Distressed returns is negative in all
states of the market factor.
Distressed funds also hold bonds; therefore, the exposure to Lehman Government Credit
bonds is positive in all states in the world, the highest being in the up-market (0.52).
Event Driven Multi-Strategy
Similar to previous results, the exposure to the change in VIX is positive and signiﬁcant,
especially during up-market periods (0.25). The strategy has a high negative exposure to
credit spread in all states of the market. Generally, event driven types of strategies do well
when credit risk premium is moderate and is declining. However, unlike Distressed strategy
managers, managers in this strategy might bet on a merger or engage in other strategies
during market upturns. The exposure to MSCIEMS is positive and signiﬁcant in all market
environments.
Risk Arbitrage
As for Equity Market Neutral, the linear exposure of risk factor of this strategy is lim-
ited. Similar to Event Driven Multi-Strategy, Equity Market Neutral and Convertible Bond
Arbitrage, the exposure to the S&P 500 during normal market regimes is zero, but positive
in up and especially down-states. During the normal state, the exposure to LS is zero, but
is negative during the down-state of the market, suggesting a liquidity premium. Also, the
exposure to VG is zero in the normal regime, but is positive and signiﬁcant in both up and
down regimes.
67